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This thesis analyzes the relationship between pre-commissioning academic
background and submarine officer performance. Four measures of officer performance
are used: (1) probability of completing the nuclear training pipeline; (2) probability of
receiving an early promotion recommendation on greater than 75 percent of LT fitness
reports; (3) probability of remaining in the Navy for 10 years of commissioned service
(until the 0-4 board); and (4) probability of promoting to LCDR. Navy Promotion
History files, Officer Data Cards, Fitness Report files, and Loss files are used to
statistically analyze the impacts of college grades and major, college quality, and
commissioning source on submariner performance and retention. Non-linear maximum
likelihood techniques are used to estimate the four performance models. The findings
reveal that good grades and engineering majors have a significant positive impact on all
four performance measures including retention. There are exceptions among OCS
graduates. Grades have an insignificant effect on the probability of completing the
training pipeline and of remaining in the Navy until the 0-4 board. Also, non-technical
majors are more likely to remain in the Navy than engineering majors. USNA graduates
fare best on all performance measures with the exception of completing the training
pipeline. ROTC graduates generally fare better than OCS graduates. Among ROTC and
OCS graduates, greater college selectivity leads to higher performance but lower
retention rates for OCS graduates. There is no difference in retention rates for ROTC
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I think teaching management as a major subject for an undergraduate is
ridiculous and I can see no way that it contributes to the ability of a junior
officer to do his job.... All midshipmen should take a common core of
subjects taught at the same academic level. Electives should be offered if
time in the program of core subjects can be found, but these electives
should be rigidly limited to those which will prepare midshipmen for their
role as naval officers. The social sciences should be specifically excluded.
- - ADM Hyman G. Rickover, Director of Naval Reactors and "Father
of the Nuclear Navy", on the newly instituted majors program at the
Naval Academy, made during a 1976 hearing before the House Armed
Services Committee.
This study tests Admiral Rickover' s hypothesis and the submarine force's
continued emphasis that a strong technical background best prepares an officer for success
as a submariner.
A. BACKGROUND
The DOD and DOE handbook on naval nuclear power proudly states, "100 million
miles safely steamed on nuclear power." Jealously proud of its pristine operating record
and keenly aware of the public outrage that would follow a nuclear accident aboard a
United States submarine, the submarine force depends on the capabilities of its officers
and sailors to maintain its perfect operating record.
The intricacies of nuclear power require officers with a high degree of technical
aptitude and the ability to rapidly comprehend and respond to systems casualties. Since
the advent of naval nuclear power, the submarine force has sought college students who
possess a strong academic record and a high degree of technical aptitude to become
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submarine officers. This study finds that approximately 90 percent of submarine officers
graduated with "technical" majors in math, science, or engineering. Approximately 60
percent graduated with engineering majors. In addition, this study finds that 48 percent of
submariners achieved above a 3.20 grade-point-average (GPA), compared to only 16
percent for other unrestricted-line (URL) officers.
This study examines the effect of academic background on officer performance and
retention in the submarine force. It focuses primarily on the effect of academic
achievement as measured by grades and undergraduate major, and additionally analyzes
the effects of college quality and commissioning source. The research draws on various
aspects of human capital theory, including: returns to investment in formal education and
training, general versus specific training, and selecting the career that maximizes lifetime
earning potential.
Numerous studies of returns to investment in human capital have demonstrated
that the more educated earn more than those with less education. Our education system
assigns grades based on an individual's mastery of the subject, and grades are often used
as a tool to select individuals into certain occupations. However, several authors have
concluded that grades have little effect on measure of adult accomplishment. Also,
individuals are rewarded on the selectivity, presumably quality, of their college alma
mater. Graduates of more selective institutions tend to earn more money than graduates
of less selective institutions. The assumption is that the more selective institutions provide
a better education and have already screened and selected only the most capable
individuals. A classic study found that college grades and college quality have a positive
impact on productivity. (Wise, 1975)
The theory of human capital investment, discussed in detail in Chapter II, suggests
that formal education and training increases productivity and earnings of an individual
over time. Due to the general lack of data on worker productivity, most studies have
focused on increased earnings on the assumption that increased productivity leads to
greater pay. In the military, increased earnings result only from promotion, which is
infrequent, and length of service. However, the military's performance evaluation and
promotion system provide a metric by which to measure an individual's productivity.
Analyzing productivity rather than earnings directly tests the theory that formal education
increases productivity. This study utilizes the military's performance evaluation and
promotion system to analyze the effects of formal education and training on productivity.
Additionally, human capital theory states that there are two types of training:
general training that increases an individual's productivity to many employers equally,
and specific training that increases an individual's productivity only at the firm in which
he or she is currently employed (Becker, 1975). In this study, there are two levels at
which to consider general versus specific training. From the Navy's perspective, officer
candidates receive general training in the form of an undergraduate major which is useful
to employers other than the Navy and specific training in the form of naval indoctrination
which is only useful to the Navy. The submarine force's perspective is nearly opposite.
Naval indoctrination serves as general training which is useful to all naval warfare
communities, and undergraduate majors (at least engineering majors) serve as specific
training which prepare submarine officers for the technical complexities of nuclear power.
This study analyzes the effect of undergraduate major on performance as a submarine
officer.
Human capital theory also states that an individual chooses the occupation and
level of education that maximizes the present value of his expected lifetime earnings. This
study assumes that officer candidates select a warfare community based on which
community best matches their individual talents and interests. However, the various
commissioning sources do not provide equal amounts ofjob information.
Officer candidates enter the submarine force from three main commissioning
sources: the United States Naval Academy (USNA), the Naval Reserve Officer Training
Corps (NROTC), and the Officer Candidate School (OCS). Approximately one-third of
submarine officers graduate from each of these sources. A fourth source, no longer in
existence, the Navy Enlisted Science and Engineering Program (NESEP) commissioned
approximately three percent of submarine officers from fiscal year 1977 to fiscal year
1985.
USNA and NROTC midshipmen enter college with the expectation of becoming
an officer following graduation. They are indoctrinated into "Navy life" over a four-year
period and participate in several one-month summer cruises aboard naval vessels. The
summer cruises familiarize midshipmen with the Navy's warfare communities and enable
the midshipmen to select the community which best matches his interests and abilities.
OCS graduates, on the other hand, are recruited into the nuclear navy during their
last few years of college. Virtually all enter the Navy through the Nuclear Power Officer
Candidate (NUPOC) program. Their indoctrination consists of a three-month training
program following college graduation and a one-day tour of a submarine and submarine
base. Many had no desire to enter the military at the time they entered college and chose
to commit to service in the Navy after a couple of years at college. OCS graduates were
older, more mature, and seemingly better-informed about their job prospects following
college by the time they committed to service in the Navy. Based on human capital
theory, it is assumed that the Navy provided the greatest expected earning potential to the
OCS graduates. However, it is expected that the OCS graduates selected the submarine
community (vice other naval communities) based on less information than USNA and
NROTC graduates.
NESEP graduates are prior enlisted members who were selected from the ranks to
become an officer. The NESEP program has been replaced by the Nuclear Enlisted
Commissioning Program (NECP) which is a part of the navy's Enlisted Commissioning
Program (ECP). This study will not focus on NESEP graduates as they compose such a
small percentage of submarine officers.
Nobody denies the submarine force's need for intelligent officers with a strong
technical background. However, college students with good grades, particularly those
with technical majors, are difficult to recruit and may be less motivated to stay in the Navy
due to greater civilian employment opportunities. This study sought to determine if good
grades and a strong technical background are actually the ingredients necessary for
success as a submariner.
B. OBJECTIVE
The objective of this thesis is to measure the impacts of college grades,
undergraduate major, college quality, and commissioning source on submariner
performance and retention. Three measures of performance are used: successfully
completing the nuclear training pipeline; likelihood of being RAP'd (recommended for
accelerated promotion) on greater than 75 percent of 0-3 (LT) fitness reports; and
promotion to 0-4 (LCDR). Utilizing multivariate modeling techniques, the intention is to
test the "Rickover hypothesis" that a strong technical background best prepares naval
officers, especially submarine officers, to handle the complexities of modern technology.
The primary goal is to determine if good grades and a strong technical background are
actually the ingredients necessary for success as a submariner. Also, due to the fact that it
is difficult to retain officers who possess stellar academic records, particularly those with
technical majors, the study analyzes the likelihood that an officer remains in the Navy
through ten years-of-service (until the 0-4 board) based on the same explanatory
variables.
This study is intended to provide recruiters, who recruit college students into the
NUPOC program, information about what type of college student (based on academic
background) is likely to perform well and is likely to remain in the Navy. The analysis is
performed first for the combined population, then separately for OCS graduates, and for
USNA and NROTC graduates combined. These sub-samples were created to determine
whether the effects of academic background are different for OCS graduates than for
USNA and NROTC graduates.
The nuclear navy's investment in submarine officers is significant. It is difficult to
recruit the type of college student that the submarine force desires, requiring larger
recruiting budgets and enticing signing bonuses. Also, this type of college student is more
difficult to retain due to greater employment opportunities, and therefore large bonuses
are required to maintain necessary force levels. The results of this analysis will address the
validity of the submarine force's current emphasis on good grades and a strong technical
background.
C. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS, AND ASSUMPTIONS
The focus of this study is on the effects of academic background on submariner
performance and retention. The effects of other college characteristics, such as
participation in athletics or other extracurricular activities, are not included. As stated
before, the intention is to test the validity of the "Rickover hypothesis" and provide
recruiters with information that will allow them to focus on college students who are likely
to perform well and remain in the Navy. Recruiters have little information other than an
individual's academic background and do not assess an individual's psychological ability
to endure the hardships of life as a submariner. It would be interesting to analyze the
effects of other college characteristics; however, the database used in this study does not
include information concerning any college characteristics other than academic
background.
Also, the effect of post-commissioning factors, such as: marital status, type of ship
served on, assigned duties, and length-of-time required to complete various qualifications
are ignored. Although these factors significantly affect an individual's performance and
desire to remain in the Navy, the intention is to analyze the effects of explanatory variables
that can be used by the recruiter. Additionally, no data was available to control for the
commissioning source of the reporting senior, the senior officer that evaluates an officer
on his fitness reports. Therefore, institutional bias
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may exist.
The study is limited to the submarine force due to the unique nature of the typical
submariner. The submarine community is the only naval warfare community that utilizes
academic screens to select which officer candidates it desires, and therefore the typical
submarine officer has much better grades and a stronger technical background than the
typical officer in other naval communities. The validity of the "Rickover hypothesis" is
tested on the community that places the greatest emphasis on a strong technical
background and has the luxury to exclude officer candidates with weaker academic
records.
Current analysis techniques do not allow us to differentiate the individual effects of
the cognitive abilities gained as a result of an officer's undergraduate major from his
inherent abilities. However, the intent of the study is to analyze the collective effect of
undergraduate major (acquired and inherent abilities) in order to determine which major
produces the most capable submariners, not just which provides the best preparation.
Also, there is no attempt to determine why better grades lead to better performance. This
study is not concerned whether it is because students with better grades are actually more
1
Institutional Bias, informally known as the "Old Boy's Network", is the notion that a Naval Academy
graduate will tend to assign more favorable grades to junior officers who are also Naval Academy
graduates.
capable or are just more motivated. The focus is on the information available to a
recruiter. Recruiters have access to college grades, but do not have access to an analysis
ofhow a student earned his grades.
To ensure there are no missing values for any variables, only submariners with
complete data on all variables are included in the analysis.
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Also, only officers who were
commissioned into the submarine community are included in the analysis. Although only
315 officers, or 8.8 percent, transferred into the submarine community after
commissioning, the intent is to analyze the effects of academic background on just the
officers who were initially recruited to be submarine officers, testing the policies used to
screen candidates for the submarine force.
The model that measures an officer's performance as an 0-3 suffers from
additional missing values. Because the model measures performance based on 0-3 fitness
reports, the sample excludes officers for whom 0-3 fitness report information is not
available.
3 An analysis of the observations with missing values indicates that there is little
or no systematic relationship with any of the explanatory variables. There is, however, a
significant relationship with the other dependent variables. Of officers with no 0-3 fitness
report information, 88 percent left the Navy prior to their 0-4 board, compared to 55
percent of officers with information. Of those who stayed until their 0-4 board, 41
percent of officers without 0-3 fitness report information promoted to LCDR, compared
to 81 percent of those with information. Due to little correlation between missing 0-3
2
This process resulted in 959 of 4526 officers commissioned as a submariner (21 percent) being excluded
from the study.
3
This process resulted in 477 of 3076 submarine LT's (15.5 percent) being excluded from the study.
fitness report information and the explanatory variables; and, in order to prevent overly
small sample sizes, no officers were excluded from the other models based on missing 0-3
fitness report information.
Measuring the likelihood of completing the nuclear training pipeline is based on the
assumption that an officer who transfers out of the submarine community between
commissioning and the 0-3 board, at approximately three years-of-service, failed to
complete the nuclear training pipeline. This assumption should hold true for a significant
majority of the officers who transferred to other communities.
Finally, the analysis suffers from small sample sizes. The whole population is of
sufficient size, but some of the groups within the population are relatively small. For
example, humanities majors make up only two percent (74 out of 3567) of the whole
submarine officer population. Less than ten percent of submariners graduated with
degrees in non-technical (social sciences, management, and humanities) areas. 4
D. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
This study is organized into five chapters. Chapter II reviews various aspects of
human capital theory, information concerning submariner recruitment and career
progression, military fitness reports and promotion boards, and previous studies which
have analyzed the returns to human capital and the use of military fitness reports as a
4 The smallest subset is analyzed in the promotion model using only graduates of the NUPOC program.
There are 292 observations in this subset. 227 (81 percent) promote to LCDR. The effect of a humanities
major was found to be significant despite the fact that only 24 officers (eight percent) graduated with a
humanities major.
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means of measuring productivity. Chapter HI describes the data used in this thesis and
discusses the specification of the various multivariate models used to analyze the effects of
academic background. Chapter IV presents the results of initial descriptive analyses and
more complex regression analyses using multivariate models of retention and performance.
The marginal effects of the explanatory variables are also discussed in Chapter IV.
Chapter V provides conclusions and recommendations on further research. Appendix A
lists the complete analytical results, including probit coefficient estimates, chi-square
values, and level-of-significance of each variable. Finally, Appendix B lists the distribution
of submarine officers among the various categories. It includes both the actual numbers of




This Chapter reviews various labor economics theories used in this study. These
include theories of "human capital," "screening," and "self-selectivity." Additionally, this
chapter provides information concerning career progression in the submarine force, and
the military's officer evaluation (fitness reports) and promotion system. The chapter ends
with a review of several studies relevant to issues covered in this study.
Very few studies have analyzed the effects of human capital on productivity using
firm-level data. Most of these studies suffered from the lack of a direct measure of job
productivity and following the labor market theory that workers are paid according to
their marginal productivity, most of these studies used salary or hourly wages to estimate
job productivity. However, in many cases, the studies failed to provide information on the
structure of the personnel system. Despite the use of earnings as a measure of an
individual's productivity, no information was given about promotion between grades or
other means by which an individual increases his earnings.
This study, however, utilizes data that directly measures the productivity of a
submarine officer. It examines the effect of college academic background on job success
using a unique micro database consisting of naval officers. The data set contains relatively
detailed information on the promotion outcomes, performance ratings by supervisors, and
numerous background characteristics such as college grades and major, and prior
performance in the organization. An advantage of the data set in exploring worker
productivity is the organization's well-defined personnel system and career paths. The
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military is characterized as a vertical hierarchy with a well-developed internal labor
market. All officers are in managerial and professional positions, and start their careers in
entry-level positions with a bachelor's degree. Also, all are subject to an up-or-out screen
at a certain point in their careers. The advantages of using data for personnel in a single
organization is that the research design controls for huge differences in personnel
structure, career paths, job assignment policies, and incentives. (Mehay and Bowman,
1997b)
The impacts of academic background are important to the Navy, because the Navy
expends great effort and resources to recruit and retain officers with the intellectual ability
and technical aptitude necessary to succeed as submariners. An increase in each of the
measures used in this study to estimate academic background (college quality, college
grades, and technical aptitude as measured by college major) results in an individual who
has greater employment opportunities available to him. Therefore, he becomes more
difficult to recruit and seemingly more difficult to retain.
A. THEORETICAL BASES
This study draws on various aspects of human capital theory, including: returns to
investment in formal education and training, general versus specific training, and selecting
the career that maximizes lifetime earning potential. Theories in labor economics based
upon the use of education as a screening device and self-selection bias are also utilized.
14
1. Human Capital Theory
Investments, by definition, entail an initial cost that one hopes to recoup over
some period of time. "Investments in human capital" refer to initial costs incurred by an
individual with the expectation that the investment will pay off in the form of higher
productivity (leading to higher earnings), reduced job turnover, and greater job
satisfaction. Human capital investments include education and training, migration, and
searching for new jobs. 5 (Ehrenberg, 1994) This study will focus on the effects of
education and training.
An individual is assumed to make personal investments in schooling, vocational
training, and (firm-specific and general) on-the-job training (Becker, 1960). Human
capital investments will be undertaken as long the expected returns, in the form of
enhanced earnings, long-term job opportunities, and job satisfaction, exceed total cost
incurred. Both quantity and quality measures of human capital are approximated in this
study by the choice of academic major and grades earned. Grades are assumed to be a
measure of an individual's mastery of the subject material, and therefore the quality of the
human capital gained. (Bowman, 1990)
The introductory chapter briefly mentions the difference between general vs.
specific training. General training increases an individual's productivity to many
employers equally, and specific training increases an individual's productivity only at the
Human capital investment in education and training results in initial costs in the form of tuition
and forgone earnings during the period of education.
Migration and Job Search are activities that result in lost wages and moving costs, but increase
the value of one's human capital by increasing the price (wage) received for a given stock of skills.
(Ehrenberg, 1994)
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firm in which he or she is currently employed. Submarine officers receive general training
in the form of management and leadership experience, and a college education. Specific
training consists of naval indoctrination from each of the commissioning sources and the
nuclear power training pipeline for one-and-a-half years following commissioning. The
training program is described later in section B of this chapter. An engineering major also
serves as a form of specific training as it increases an individual's degree of technical
aptitude, preparing him for the complexities of nuclear power.
Human capital theory explains that employers are more willing to pay for an
employee's specific training rather than general training. Assume an employee's marginal
productivity equals MPi before training and increases to MP2 after training. 6 The
employee is paid wage Wi when his productivity equals MPi. After training, the
employee's productivity increases to MP2, and one would expect that the employee's
wage would increase to W2 commensurate to his increase in productivity. However, the
employer must recover the cost of the training, assuming the employer paid for the
training. Therefore, the employee's wage will increase to W* which is less than W2 . The
difference between the employee's worth to the company and the employee's wage allows
the employer to recover training costs. If the training was specific, the employee's worth
to other employers remains at the pre-training level of MPi, and the employee remains
with the current employer because his current wage (W*) is greater than the wage (Wi) he
could earn from other employers. However, if the training was general, the employee's
6
Equations relevant to discussion: MPi=Wi, MP2= W2 , MP]<MP2 , Wi<W-< W2
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worth increases to MP2 for all employers. Therefore, since W* < W2 , the employee will be
likely to quit because he can demand wage W2 from other employers.
Because submarine officers have earned better grades and displayed greater
intellectual ability than the average officer in other naval communities, it is evident that
they possess greater amounts ofhuman capital. The Navy realizes the worth of submarine
officers to employers other than the military, and pays financial bonuses to improve
retention. The Nuclear Officer Incentive Program (NOEP) was initiated in June 1969 to
combat the chronic shortage of nuclear-trained submarine officers. Over the years,
authorization for the NOIP program has been expanded and annual payment amounts have
also increased (Nakada and Boyle, 1996). An officer receives Continuation Pay
(COPAY), $12,000 per year, if he agrees to remain in the nuclear navy for a term of three,
four, or five years. Alternatively, an officer who does not sign a contract receives an
Annual Incentive Bonus (AIB), $10,000 per year, for each year he remains in the nuclear
navy. Additionally, officer candidates are paid an accession bonus of $6,000 when they
agree to enter the nuclear navy. The payments were increased to the current level in
August 1996. (Feeley, 1996)
Both quantity and quality measures of human capital are approximated in this
study by college major and grades. It is assumed, for example, that a greater quantity of
specialized training is acquired by an engineering major relative to a humanities major,
while an engineering major with superior grades in engineering courses possesses a greater
quality of human capital than do others in his major. A similar argument could be made
with regard to more general training for those majoring in the humanities. The model
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assumes that the quantity and quality of specialized and general training determine which
graduates are more likely to perform well as submarine officers. The impact on rate of
retention of the two types of training acquired in college is ambiguous, however. While
general training obviously has applicability to all jobs, it is also true that specific technical
training acquired in college has applications in occupations found in both the military and
civilian labor markets. As such, it is not clear whether the more technically oriented
graduate is more or less likely to remain in the Navy than is the less technically oriented
graduate. (Bowman, 1990)
Human capital theory states that an individual chooses the occupation and level of
education that maximizes the present value of his expected lifetime earnings. "Earnings"
refers to more than just financial compensation. It also refers to intrinsic forms of
compensation such as job satisfaction and quality-of-life. This study assumes that USNA
and NROTC graduates have selected the submarine community as the best option among
the naval warfare communities, whereas OCS graduates selected the Navy and the
submarine community as the best option among a wider range of employment
opportunities, including civilian employment.
7
This study also assumes that the typical
college student selects the major that maximizes his utility. Therefore, he selects a major
that provides the best combination (for him) of matching his skills, his work ethic, his
interests, and his expectations for future employment.
7
This assumption is based on the fact that USNA and NROTC midshipmen are required to enter the Navy
following graduation, and therefore must select an occupation from among the naval warfare
communities. OCS graduates, on the other hand, agree to enter the nuclear navy during their junior year
of college or later. The Navy is one of many employers the OCS graduate could choose.
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This thesis explores the hypothesis that individuals who decided to attend USNA
were more serious about a career in the Navy as they entered college than those that were
commissioned NROTC and OCS. Individuals commissioned through NROTC were
willing to enter the Navy following graduation from college, but chose not to accept the
loss of freedom and hardships associated with military life at USNA. Virtually all
submariners who were commissioned through OCS had been recruited into the nuclear
navy during their junior or senior year of college. Many had no desire to enter the military
at the time they entered college and chose to commit to service in the Navy after a couple
of years at college. This can have opposite effects on performance as an officer and
retention. OCS graduates were older, more mature, and seemingly better-informed about
their job prospects following college by the time they committed to service in the Navy.
However, an OCS graduate may view service in the Navy as best of a list of poor job
prospects following college graduation.
8 The typical OCS graduate did not display a
propensity for military life before entering college, but may have considered the nuclear
navy a good stepping stone to future employment.
2. Screening And Internal Labor Markets
The use of screening devices is an inexpensive method for employers to minimize
hiring costs while maximizing productivity. However, a major problem with the use of
credentials, or screening devices, to predict which applicants will become good employees
8 The officers analyzed in this study entered the Navy from 1977 to 1985. Unemployment rates were
much higher during this time than now, and college graduates did not have the tremendous range of
employment options that are currently available to graduates.
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is that these credentials may only be loosely related to retention or actual productivity on
the job. Such personal attributes as dependability, motivation, honesty, and flexibility are
difficult to observe using credentials, yet for many jobs such attributes are crucial. This
difficulty with screening has induced some firms to adopt a policy of hiring workers at
low-level jobs, observing their behavior, and filling all upper-level jobs from within the
firm. (Ehrenberg and Smith, 1994)
Hiring employees only at entry-level positions creates an internal labor market
because most jobs in the firm are filled from within the ranks of current employees.
Employers hire workers into low-level positions where a less productive employee cannot
cause too much harm and more productive employees can be identified and promoted.
This ensures that higher level positions are filled only by proven employees, but it also
restricts the pool of applicants for higher positions. Employees in the firm may not be the
best employees available, but they are the only ones considered for these jobs. Firms most
likely to decide that the benefits of using an internal labor market outweigh the costs are
those whose upper-level workers must have a lot of firm-specific knowledge and training
that can best be attained by on-the-job learning over the years. (Ehrenberg and Smith,
1994)
The submarine officer community can be characterized as an internal labor market
as all officers enter at the lowest level. Some officers transfer into the submarine
community after commissioning, but they must complete the training pipeline and enter the
submarine community at the lowest level. It would be difficult, if not impossible, for an
officer to become a successful commanding officer of a submarine without an entire career
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as a submarine officer. Therefore, it is important for the submarine community to identify
useful screening devices for selecting officer candidates.
There are debates over the returns to college education concerning whether the
education actually increases an individual's cognitive skills or if it merely serves as a
screening device to indicate which students have the motivation and skills necessary to
complete a college degree. Those that argue it serves merely as a screen point out the fact
that rates of return for college graduates are higher than for college dropouts. Because
there is a sudden increase in earnings when a diploma is earned, they argue that the
diploma serves as a screening device. On the other hand, those that believe schooling
enhances human capital, argue that one who graduates after four years probably has
learned more than four times what the freshman dropout has learned. They argue that
dropouts are more likely to be poorer students—the ones who overestimated their returns
on schooling and quit when they discovered their mistake. (Ehrenberg and Smith, 1994)
This study does not analyze whether a diploma serves as a screening device, but
instead looks at commissioning source and the use of college grades and major as a
screening device. Because all officers in this study possess a bachelor's degree, a college
diploma does not serve as a screening device, but college major and grades may. The
nuclear navy values technical aptitude, and primarily seeks candidates from technical
majors. However, any student who has displayed above-average academic ability, through
good grades, has the potential to be selected by the submarine community.
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3. Self-Selection
Self-selection is another important issue. As shown in Table 2.1, over 90 percent
of submarine officers graduated with a technical degree (i.e., engineering, mathematics, or
physical sciences), compared with just 53 percent in other warfare communities. In
addition, 48 percent of submariners achieved above a 3.20 grade point average (GPA) as
compared with only 16 percent of officers in other warfare communities. Since technical
majors and academic performance vary by service community selection, failure to account
for screening and self-selection could bias the evaluation of the relationship between
academic schooling and fleet performance and retention.
Table 2.1 Percent Distribution of Graduates Across Warfare Communities By
Academic Major and Achievement by Graduates in Various ; Majors Categories9
Submarine Community Other URL Communities
(N=3,567) (N=l 5,973)
Academic Major
Biology/Physical Sciences 21.2 16.5
Math/Computer Science 9.4 9.8
Engineering 60.7 26.7
















All figures drawn from the database used in this study.
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First, students select which commissioning source to attend and what course of
study (college major) they wish to pursue. Second, service selection from USNA and
NROTC is based on an individual's standing in his class rank so that higher achievers and
those more motivated may self-select into the submarine force, as it has come to represent
the "cutting edge" and presents the greatest intellectual challenge for future Navy leaders.
Finally, graduates with more extensive technical training and/or superior performance in
technical courses may be viewed as having greater quantities of specific human capital
relevant to the submarine force and are therefore favored by the nuclear power selection
board.
This study does not attempt to isolate the portion of the error term caused by self-
selection. Because this study is interested in what type of person and what type of
preparation fares best in the submarine force, it is desirable to include the effects of self-
selection bias as part of the effect of the explanatory variables. Moreover, it is not
possible to isolate the effect of an individual selecting a certain major or commissioning
source because information is not available to explain why the selection was made.
There seems to be two opposite influences on the effect of selection bias (with
regards to undergraduate major) in this study. Because students who inherently have a
high degree of technical aptitude are more likely to select engineering majors, the value of
an engineering major will be overstated. However, the students with non-technical majors
who are selected to be in the submarine force are not the typical liberal arts major.
Officials at Naval Reactors in Washington, D.C. interview all candidates regardless of
major, grades earned, or commissioning source prior to selecting which students to
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accept. The interview process consists of two one-on-one technical interviews designed
to assess a candidate's degree of technical aptitude. Therefore, candidates with non-
technical majors will have demonstrated an acceptable level of technical aptitude and
impressed the officials at Naval Reactors with other factors such as command presence
and personality. This screening process understates the effect of an engineering major
because of the exceptionally high quality of candidates accepted from liberal arts majors.
B. CAREER PROGRESSION, FITNESS REPORTS, AND PROMOTION
The submarine force draws approximately one-third of its officers from each of the
three main commissioning sources: USNA, NROTC, and OCS. Because all naval officers
possess at least a bachelor's degree, the submarine force does not use possession of a
college degree as a screening device, but instead uses the type of degree and the level of
grades earned. The submarine force considers it imperative that all submarine officers
demonstrate a high level of technical aptitude. Therefore, it seeks primarily college
students with engineering degrees, and sets minimum requirements for college physics and
calculus courses.
10
College major and grades are used as an initial screen to identify
students who are likely to possess the necessary level of technical aptitude, but do not
10 COMNAVCRUITCOMINST 1131.2A, the Naval Recruiting Command's Instruction for recruiting
college students into the NUPOC program, requires:
(1) Calculus . One year i.e., two semesters, two trimesters, or three quarters of college calculus through
differential and integral calculus of one real variable with a "B" average or better grade (a "C"
average or better if the candidate is in a physics, math or engineering curriculum major. .
.).
(2) Physics . One year i.e., two semesters, two trimesters, or three quarters of a college calculus-based
physics course covering the classic fundamentals of mechanics, magnetism and electricity with a "B"
average or better grade (a "C" average or better if the candidate is a physics, math or engineering
curriculum major...).
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serve as the final discriminators. In addition to the two technical interviews, candidates
are interviewed by the Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program, currently Admiral
Bowman. The criteria used by the Director for selection is not published, but he does
have the final determination on the fate of each candidate.
While in college, officer candidates are informed about the submarine community
and life in the Navy. Naval academy midshipmen effectively serve a four-year
apprenticeship before commissioning so that they acquire greater stock of navy-specific
human capital and tend to assimilate more easily into the team production environment of
the Navy (Mehay and Bowman, 1997a). USNA midshipmen typically are better informed
about the various naval communities. NROTC midshipmen take several military classes in
college; participate in various "naval" activities such as drill and sailing; and train on
operational naval vessels during the summer months much like USNA midshipmen. OCS
midshipmen receive no military training in college and attend a 12-week "crash course" on
military life prior to becoming officers. Before a college student commits to the NUPOC
program,
11 he is provided an all-expenses-paid trip to a submarine base. He tours the base
and one of the submarines in port, speaking with submarine officers on board. NESEP
graduates are prior enlisted sailors with significant military experience and proven
capabilities. They were selected from among the ranks of enlisted sailors to become an
officer.
11 Once committing to the NUPOC program, a college student is legally bound to join the Navy. Failure
to join the Navy can result in a mandatory two-year term as an enlisted sailor in the Navy.
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1. Career Progression
Once commissioned, submarine officers receive one year of nuclear training and
four months of general training on submarine systems and tactics. The nuclear training
consists of six months of theoretical classroom training at the Navy's Nuclear Power
School (NPS) in Orlando, Florida. The training covers a wide range of engineering-
related subjects such as Heat Transfer, Thermodynamics, Electrical Engineering,
Chemistry, and Materials Science. The training also covers reactor theory and various
theoretical aspects of operating a naval nuclear reactor.
Following Nuclear Power School, officers spend six months learning how to
operate a naval nuclear reactor at one of the Navy's Nuclear Prototype Training Units
(NPTU). The NPTU in Charleston, South Carolina consists of two submarines that have
been permanently connected to a pier. The submarines still have the original nuclear
reactor and engineering spaces. Officers learn how various systems operate and spend a
significant portion of their time operating the reactor and the equipment in the engineering
spaces. They learn the duties associated with each of the enlisted watchstations in a
submarine's engineering spaces under the instruction of qualified enlisted sailors; and they
learn how to manage the entire operation as the Engineering Officer Of the Watch
(EOOW), the officer responsible for the safe and proper operation of the reactor and
engineering equipment. Officers will stand watch as EOOW when they serve aboard a
submarine.
Finally, officers attend the Submarine Officer Basic Course (SOBC) in Groton,
Connecticut. At SOBC, the officers learn about the other non-nuclear-related systems
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aboard a submarine such as the navigation, diving, sonar, and weapons systems. They will
train on simulators that closely resemble the real systems aboard a submarine. Upon
graduation from SOBC, the officers have completed the initial training pipeline of nearly
18 months and are assigned to a submarine.
There are four levels of seniority among officers aboard a submarine. The most
senior, the Commanding Officer (CO), holds the rank of Commander (CDR), grade 0-5,
and will have served approximately 16 to 19 years of commissioned service. The second
level, the Executive Officer (XO), holds the rank of Lieutenant Commander (LCDR),
grade 0-4, and will have served approximately 12 to 14 years of commissioned service.
The third level consists of three (four on Trident submarines) 12 Department Heads (DH)
who have served approximately seven to ten years of commissioned service. The
department heads are put in charge of the three departments (Engineering, Navigation,
and Combat Systems) aboard a submarine. The department heads initially hold the rank of
Lieutenant (LT), grade 0-3, and may be promoted to LCDR during their three years as a
department head. The Engineering Officer is spot-promoted to LCDR soon after
reporting aboard as a department head. Finally, the least experienced officers are
appropriately called "Junior Officers" (JO's) and serve as division officers in charge of one
of the divisions aboard a submarine. JO's have served for two to five years of
commissioned service and range in rank from Ensign (0-1) to Lieutenant (0-3). Table 2.2
summarizes the duties assigned to officers through a typical career.
12 There are two main types of submarines in the U.S. Navy. Fast-attack submarines (SSN), the smaller of
the two, are used for a variety of missions. Trident submarines (SSBNs) carry ballistic missiles and serve
primarily as part of the United States' policy of nuclear deterrence through Mutually Assured Destruction.
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Table 2.2 Duty Assignments During A Typical Career
Years of Duty
Commissioned Service Assignment
16-19 CO Sea Tour
14-16 Shore
12-14 XO Sea Tour
10-12 Shore
7-10 DH Sea Tour
5-7 Shore
2-5 JO Sea Tour
0-2 Training Pipeline
Graduates of all three commissioning sources incur a commitment to serve at least
five years of commissioned service. As shown in Table 2.2, officers will complete their
first tour of duty aboard a submarine by this time. In this study, only 15.7 percent of
submarine officers choose to leave the Navy immediately after their initial obligation is
complete. However, over half of the original 3,567 submariners leave the Navy before the
tenth year of service. This means that a significant number (41 percent of the original
3,567) of officers chose to complete a two-year shore tour following their JO sea tour and
left the Navy after seven years of commissioned service. 13
2. Fitness Reports
The report on the fitness of officers (FITREP or fitness report) is the major
document used for periodic internal evaluation of the performance of naval officers.
Fitness reports are completed annually and provide information to the Navy that is
important for promotion, billet assignment, and retention. Fitness reports require the CO
13
All figures drawn from the database used in this study.
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to evaluate the officers onboard his submarine with regard to various aspects considered
important to the Navy. The CO must grade such aspects as: response in stressful
situations, speaking and writing ability, equipment management, watchstanding ability,
tactical proficiency, and leadership. Fitness reports also provide information on
performance relative to other officers at the same command, which is one of the criteria
used in measuring an officer's productivity. The CO must rank each officer, and comment
on his command desirability, and decide whether to recommend the officer for early
promotion, regular promotion, or no promotion. (Bjerke, 1987)
Most CO's complete fitness reports with two purposes in mind: promotion
potential, and command-related selection decisions. However, CO's have expressed a
conflict between their obligation to identify average (or less than average) performers and
their obligation to write evaluations that will not destroy an officer's chance for
promotion. Consequently, most junior officers tend to be ranked in the top one percent.
This tendency has increased over the years and is referred to as "grade inflation." The
growing problem of grade inflation has led to doubts about the usefulness of fitness
reports in selecting officers for promotion and assignment. 14 However, there are a few
elements on fitness reports with sufficient variability to support the belief that fitness
reports can be used as an indicator of an officer's promotability and potential for
14 The Navy instituted a new fitness report form in 1995 with the intention of minimizing grade inflation.
The new form is graded on a 5.0 scale and provides descriptive standards associated with each mark for
the areas evaluated. Also, the new form prohibits verbal comparisons of officers within a competitive
category. For example, a CO cannot make a comment such as "My best LT," but he can write "My best
junior officer" because several grades make up the group ofjunior officers. However, the form provides
five levels of recommendations for promotion and requires a forced distribution of the recommendations
for all officers within a competitive category. Only the older fitness reports are used in this study.
29
command. (Bjerke, 1987) A 1989 study by Idell Neumann of the Navy Personnel
Research and Development Center (NPRDC), San Diego, found sufficient variability in
the element "recommended for accelerated promotion" (RAP) to be used as a
performance index. Neumann's study is discussed further in the following section of this
chapter.
3. Promotion to LCDR (0-4)
Selection boards, manned by senior officers within each community, decide who
will promote to the next senior grade. Promotion to lieutenant junior grade (LTjg) and
lieutenant (LT) is nearly automatic with less than five percent of officers failing to
promote. However, promotion to LCDR presents the first significant hurdle to a
submarine officer's career. By the time of the 0-4 board, six out often submariners will
have left the Navy, mostly voluntarily. Of the remaining 40 percent, approximately 80
percent successfully promote to LCDR.
An officer may receive three opportunities (be reviewed by three selection boards)
for promotion to LCDR. The board convenes annually and officers typically are
considered for promotion during their ninth through eleventh year of commissioned
service.
C. RELEVANT PAST STUDIES
Many studies have validated the theory that education, as an investment in human
capital, leads to positive returns. Individuals investing in more education (to a point) have
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earned more and enjoyed greater job satisfaction. There is a growing body of research
that has analyzed the relationships between college characteristics and worker
productivity. However, most of these studies lack direct measures of worker productivity
and instead use hourly pay or annual earnings as an estimate of worker productivity.
These studies have focused on the effect of college selectivity; testing the assumption that
attending a more selective, and presumably higher quality, institution will lead to higher
earnings. Additionally, the studies have analyzed the effects of college major and grade
point average, testing the impact of cognitive skills and the combined effect of college
quality and student performance on earnings. (Mehay and Bowman, 1997b)
Other studies have attempted to more directly measure the effects of college
characteristics on earnings by analyzing employees in a single firm. A well-known study
by Wise (1975), investigated the effects of both personal and college characteristics on
worker productivity at a large manufacturing firm. He used growth in annual earnings and
frequency of promotions as proxies for productivity. Wise assumed that the probability of
promotion from one level to the next was evidence of relative job performance and he
regarded promotion as a more direct measure of performance than earnings. He stated
that it is wrong to assume that earnings match individual performance because salaries are
tied to positions within an organization, rather than to the performance of the individual
filling the position at any one time. Therefore, he reasoned that the differences between
grade levels and rate of promotion may be a better proxy for job performance than salary.
The study analyzed white males hired at a single manufacturing firm between 1946
and 1964 who were still employed by the firm in 1968 and who were not more than 30
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years old when hired. He included both technical and non-technical positions. A random
stratified sample of 1,300 workers was selected for analysis from approximately 6,800
persons. Information on the workers included selectivity of college attended, grade point
average, college major, and employment history.
Wise found that the relationship between college quality and grades, and worker
performance was "not only statistically significant but. .. quantitatively important." He also
observed that individuals from the most selective schools with high grades have an
estimated rate of salary increase that is twice that of graduates from the least selective
schools with low grades.
Wise's study has been criticized because the sample of workers analyzed is not
representative of the nation's overall work force population and because he failed to
describe the structure of the internal labor market. The study includes only white males
and it excludes workers whom, for whatever reason, were no longer employed with their
initial hiring employer. Therefore, omitted from the analysis are those who chose to leave
voluntarily for better jobs and/or higher pay and those involuntarily released by the firm.
Wise's failure to describe the structure of the internal labor market is serious because his
study is based on promotion within the firm. Without knowledge of the firm's career
ladders, there is no way to determine the pool of personnel eligible and qualified for
promotion, thus promotion rates are likely to be measured incorrectly. (Mehay and
Bowman, 1997b)
Edward Lazear (1977) questioned Wise's conclusion that college education
contributes to productive ability, calling it unwarranted. Lazear felt the results of Wise's
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study could support the theory that education serves as a screen as well as the conclusion
that it improves job productivity. Screening theory states that education does not improve
an individual's productivity, but rather serves as a criterion which employers use to sort
individuals. According to screening theory, the output enhancement of grades is solely
through an informational role of differentiating individual ability levels to prospective
employers.
This thesis also utilizes a population that is not representative of the nation's
workforce population, but it is not the objective of this study to determine the effects of
academic background for the average American worker. However, the second criticism is
corrected in this study. This study will also use promotion probability as a measure of
productivity, but in the context of the well-defined internal labor market and career path of
submarine officers. A detailed description of the submarine community's internal labor
market and the performance measures used in this study is provided in section B of this
chapter.
More recent studies have used selected cohorts from the National Longitudinal
Survey (NLS) that appears to be more representative of the nation's work force
population. The NLS database contains information on randomly selected high school
graduates from across the nation.
James et al. (1989) used the 1972 cohort from the NLS data (NLS-72) to analyze
the impacts of college characteristics on post-college earnings. NLS-72 was initially
composed of 21,000 randomly selected high school graduates, but the study restricted the
analysis to 1,241 male survey respondents, including only those who actually graduated
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from college and were employed in 1985. These restrictions made the statistical analysis
less complex, but causes the analyzed data to be less representative of the general
workforce. (Mehay and Bowman, 1997b)
The NLS-72 data was combined with information from the Higher Education
General Information Survey (HEGIS) and the Postsecondary Education Transcript Study
(PETS). The authors sought to identify those college characteristics that create an "aspect
of quality." In the sample used, 519 colleges and universities were represented. The
HEGIS data provided information about the 519 institutions and the PETS data provided
information from the college transcripts ofthe individuals in the study.
The study analyzed the impacts of college characteristics on post-college earnings,
controlling for student background, higher educational experience, and labor market
variables. College selectivity (or college quality) was estimated by the average Scholastic
Aptitude Test (SAT) score of entering freshmen. Other institutional characteristics were
controlled, such as the percentage of part-time students, the percentage of graduating
students with liberal arts majors, and the percentage of graduate students.
The study found positive impacts of college selectivity and grade point average on
annual earnings. Also, the study found that undergraduate major had an impact too.
Engineering and business majors had a strong positive effect (30 percent and 10 percent,
respectively); education majors had a strong negative effect (15 percent); and the effects
of humanities, social sciences, mathematics, and biology/physical sciences majors were
statistically insignificant. A 100-point increase in the institution's average SAT score, the
study's proxy for college selectivity, resulted in a three percent increase in annual
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earnings. Also, grade point average (GPA) had a positive effect on annual earnings, even
when occupation was controlled. A one-letter grade increase in GPA, C to B or B to A,
resulted in a nine percent increase in annual earnings. The authors surmised that "while
GPA indicates, in part, that students have acquired specific knowledge, we think of it
additionally as a proxy for general human capital characteristics such as ability and habits
of discipline and perseverance."
The authors concluded that choice of major and grades have a much stronger
impact than the choice of institution on future earnings. They quipped, "While sending
your child to Harvard appears to be a good investment, sending him to your local state
university to major in Engineering, to take lots of math, and preferably to attain a high
GPA, is an even better investment." The model development used in this thesis is similar
to that used by James with the exception that the Barron's Index of College Selectivity is
used as a measure of college selectivity/quality. Undergraduate majors are grouped into
similar categories and grades are included in the model.
Bowman (1990), a professor of Economics at the U.S. Naval Academy, asked the
question "Do Engineers Make Better Naval Officers?" His study tested the commonly
held belief in the Navy that engineering majors provide the best preparation for officers to
handle the modern technology utilized in today's naval vessels. Admiral Rickover, the
father of the nuclear navy, was especially outspoken concerning the belief that a
technically trained undergraduate will make a better officer, leading to the moniker
"Rickover hypothesis."
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Bowman's study examined the Rickover hypothesis for a subset of USNA
graduates from 1976 through 1980 who entered the surface and submarine warfare
communities.
15 He noted that "these communities were selected because they represent
the most likely communities in which technical subjects may be applied in the work
environment aboard sophisticated warships." The sample consisted of 1,560 graduates for
whom all information used in the study was available. 16 The database used in this thesis is
an updated version ofthe database used in Bowman's study. 17
The study used two measures of performance. The first measure was based on an
officer's performance while acting as a division head on his first sea duty, approximately
his fourth year of commissioned service. The officer's performance was judged to be
"superior" if the officer was recommended for early promotion and ranked in the top one
percent category for both "command desirability" and in the "overall summary"
evaluation. Superior performance was achieved by 44.8 percent of officers ranging from
40 percent for nuclear-trained officers to 49 percent for those serving in the conventional
surface navy. The second measure was retention. It measured the probability that an
officer would remain in the service at least six months beyond his initial period of
obligation. Approximately 20 percent of the officers left the Navy immediately following
15
At USNA, all midshipmen receive a Bachelor of Science degree regardless of their undergraduate
major. Every student, even humanities majors are required to take an assortment of engineering and
science classes that meet the requirements of a Bachelor of Science degree. Additionally, the academy's
administration limits the number of midshipmen in non-engineering majors. It requires that a certain
percentage of midshipmen select engineering majors. Also, no more than 20 percent of all midshipmen
were permitted to select humanities/social science majors during the period covered in Bowman's study.
16 198 male graduates selecting the submarine or surface communities were excluded because of death,
involuntary separation, or missing information.
17
See Chapter III, DATA AND METHODOLOGY, for a description of the database used.
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their term of obligated service, 16.4 percent in the conventional surface community and 25
percent in the nuclear communities.
The study controlled for officers' personal characteristics and fleet experience,
including such factors as race, marital status, ship type, and nature of the fitness report
used to develop the performance measure. Bowman found that many of the control
factors were significantly related to officer performance and retention. Ship type was
significant in a few cases. Service on attack submarines (SSNs), relative to SSBNs,
increased the likelihood of retention by 13.9 percent. Variables that controlled for the
environment in which the fitness report was written were either insignificant or had
minimal effect. Finally, race and marital status were found to have a significant effect on
performance and retention. In the conventional surface navy: racial minorities were from
19.2 percent to 25.6 percent less likely than whites to achieve "superior" status; blacks
were 23 percent more likely to stay beyond their initial period of obligation; married
officers were 1 5 percent less likely to retain. In the nuclear navy, married officers were far
less likely than single officers to remain beyond their initial obligation; those with children
were 27.8 percent less likely to remain and those without children were 35.6 percent less
likely to remain.
Bowman attempted to test/control for self-selectivity bias through the use of the
Heckman procedure. 18 The Heckman procedure accounts for unobserved factors retained
from the selection equation (in this case, selection of warfare community) through a new
18
See Heckman, James J., 1979. "Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error," Econometrica, 47(1),
January: 153-161.
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independent variable that is added to the performance equation. This variable, LAMBDA,
was found to statistically insignificant, meaning that selectivity bias was not detected.
Despite evidence from the selection model that graduates with technical majors and higher
grades are more likely to choose and be selected by the nuclear navy, Bowman attributed
LAMBDA'S insignificance to the lack of correlation between the error structure of the
two equations. As stated before, this thesis will not attempt to account for selection bias.
It is desired that the effects of selection bias be included with the effects of the academic
variables.
Finally, Bowman found that few academic factors were significantly related to
junior officer performance and retention. Controlling for the factors listed above, he
found that academic major had little, if any, effect on retention or performance. Two
exceptions were noted in the conventional surface navy. First, management/economics
majors (relative to an engineering major) were 24.1 percent more likely to attain
"superior" status. Second, general engineering/sciences majors (relative to an engineering
major) were 8.3 percent more likely to stay beyond the initial obligation. Similarly,
insignificant relationships were found between grades and performance/retention with one
exception. A one-point differential in grades for an engineering major reduced the
probability of staying beyond the initial obligation by 13.1 percent in the nuclear navy.
Bowman's findings refuted the Rickover hypothesis that technical education
provides the best preparation for naval officers. His results were surprising considering
the emphasis placed on technical background by the nuclear navy. Several weaknesses
should be noted though. The study included only officers who graduated from the Naval
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Academy. All USNA midshipmen receive significant instruction in technical studies. In
fact, the required curriculum includes sufficient engineering and science courses for every
midshipman to graduate with a Bachelor of Science regardless of undergraduate major.
This thesis includes all officers who entered the submarine community regardless of
commissioning source.
Also, the criteria used for evaluating "superior" performance is suspect. Bowman
selected a single fitness report that indicated "frequent" contact with the reporting senior
officer, that evaluated the officer in relation to his peers (i.e., periodic/annual, or on the
occasion of detachment of a reporting senior officer), and was the last report as a division
officer. This one fitness report was critical, however, as it was the last competitive report
received by the officer as a division officer. As described above, a "superior" performer
was defined as one who was recommended for early promotion, and ranked in the top one
percent category both for "command desirability" and in the "overall summary" evaluation
on the selected fitness report. The measure is suspect because only one fitness report was
used.
Being recommended for accelerated promotion appears to be the most
discriminating performance measure available. A study conducted by Idell Neumann
(1989) of the Navy Personnel Research and Development Center (NPRDC), San Diego,
developed a performance index derived from officer fitness reports. The data for the
development of the performance index consisted of all Naval Academy graduates from
1979 through 1982 in the surface, submarine, and pilot communities. Each of the officers
had at least four years of commissioned service and the associated fitness reports.
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Neumann's objective was to identify which information on a fitness report could provide a
selection board suitable indication of an officer's promotability or worth to the Navy. She
found that "recommended for accelerated promotion" (RAP'd) was the only element with
sufficient variability to be used as a performance index. This thesis uses the likelihood of
an officer being RAP'd on greater than 75 percent of his 0-3 fitness reports as a measure
of performance.
More recently, Mehay and Bowman (1997b) analyzed the impact of college quality
and academic performance on the job performance of naval officers. Their study utilized
the same database used in this thesis. The database consists of 24,672 operational (in one
of the warfare communities) officers and 9,356 similar staff officers who graduated from
over 563 private and public colleges and universities between 1977 and 1985. Information
is available through the first ten years of each officer's career or until separation from the
Navy.
Their results corroborated those of previous studies of civilian workers, which
found that academic achievement and college quality had a positive impact on earnings.
The study found that graduates of elite colleges are more productive in the work place,
even after controlling for grades and majors. Also, better grades were found to improve
the probability of promoting to LCDR. However, their results contradicted the findings of
past studies of civilian workers that technical majors lead to higher earnings. They found
that technical degrees negatively affected on-the-job performance and that no major had a
significant effect on promotion to LCDR.
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Michael Nakada and James Boyle (1996) analyzed the effect of the Nuclear Officer
Incentive Pay (NOJP) program on nuclear officer retention beyond minimum service
requirement (MSR). While an economic model, not the focus of this study, their
conclusions made statements, which are relevant to the research in this study. They found
that accession source was significant in retention decisions. Specifically, USNA graduates
had the highest retention rates beyond MSR. They also determined that as the number of
household dependents increased, the likelihood of retention increased. Again in 1996,
Nakada led another study to expand his research conducted with Boyle (Nakada, et al.,
1996). This second study quantified the effects ofNOJP for individual years beyond MSR
and found effects that were consistent with the earlier research. By using an Annual Cost
Of Leaving (ACOL) model, Nakada quantified retention at annual increments and not just
specific transition points in a military career. Both studies found that bonuses had a
positive effect on retention. "For both communities, the retention elasticities with respect
to the NOJJP retention bonus program were small, but significant indicating that 'pay does
matter.'"
This thesis extends research on the returns to investments in education and more
specifically provides nuclear navy recruiters with valuable information. Although many
studies, including studies of naval officers, have analyzed the returns to a college
education, none have been conducted with the objective of providing information that will
aid recruitment efforts. This study identifies what type college academic background
signifies an individual who is likely to perform well as a submarine officer and is likely to
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remain in the submarine community. NUPOC recruiters can use this information to target
college students who are likely to perform well in the submarine community.
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III. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
This chapter discusses the database and how it is used to develop the explanatory
variables, which describe undergraduate academic experience and performance outcomes
introduced in Chapter I. A discussion of the statistical methodologies used in the study
concludes the chapter.
A. DESCRIPTION OF DATABASE USED IN THIS STUDY
The database derived in this study comes from one that includes nearly all of the
college graduates who were commissioned as naval officers from 1977 to 1985 and
follows them through their first ten years in the Navy. A negligible minority of the
population, who left the Navy involuntarily or for medical reasons during the first two
grades (Ensign and LTjg) while serving their initial obligation, is missing from the
database. The database approximates a longitudinal cohort file in that it builds prior
employment histories from retrospective data collected for all officers appearing at the O-
3 (3 YCS) and 0-4 (10 YCS) promotion boards, as well as those who leave the Navy up
through the 0-4 board. Any officer leaving because of medical reasons or death during
this period is purposely excluded. The resulting basic data includes 24,672 operational
officers who are automatically considered for promotion to LT during their third year of
service.
This database is derived from three existing administrative data files maintained on
every U.S. Navy officer by the Naval Bureau of Personnel, Washington, DC. The first
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data file utilizes a wealth of information contained in the Navy History Promotion Files,
which is a combination of data elements taken from Officer Data Cards and promotion
outcomes. The file contains over 600 data elements. A second file, the Officer Loss file,
is used to ascertain the timing and reason why any officer in the data set left active duty.
The last file is composed of summary data from fitness reports for nearly ninety percent of
all officers in the data set. Naval officers are evaluated at least once a year on a fitness
report. Additional fitness reports are completed when an officer or the reporting senior
officer completes duty at the command. The resulting database, used in this study,
contains detailed information concerning demographics, pre-commissioning
characteristics, and work history for the first ten years of an officer's career.
Because the objective of this study is to analyze the impact of academic
background on submariner performance and retention, the officer community designator is
used to restrict the sample to the submarine community. To ensure there are no missing
values for any variables, only officers with complete data on all elements are included in
the analysis.
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Table 3.1 lists the initial mean values of important explanatory variables
used in the study (e.g., prior enlisted experience, ethnicity, commissioning source, college
selectivity, undergraduate major, and college grades). The table provides a comparison of
the mean values for officers included in the study to those excluded due to missing values.
19
This process results in 959 of 4526 officers commissioned as a submariner (21 percent) being excluded
from the study. About four-fifths of the exclusions are due to missing grades, the other one-fifth are
missing information on the officer's undergraduate major.
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Table 3.1 Comparison of Means for Submariners Included in the Study to Those
Excluded (Initial Population)
Explanatory Submariners included in Submariners excluded due
Variable model (N=3567) to missing values (N=959)
Demographics




Math/Computer Science .094 .089
Engineering .607 .669










High Selectivity .414 .463
Medium Selectivity .292 .390
Low Selectivity .294 .146
For OCS Graduates:
High Selectivity .159 .207
Medium Selectivity .394 .417
Low Selectivity .447 .376
Academic Achievement
GPA (top three categories)
5: 3.60-4.00 .162 .191






"Promotion" 20 .351 .152
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These numbers represent the percentage of all submariners included in this study that promote to
LCDR Promotion rate is the percentage of those who stay until the 0-4 board that promote to LCDR
Promotion rate of those who stayed until the 0-4 board equals PROMOTE / RETAIN. Therefore, for
those included in the study, 80.9 percent (.351/.409) promoted to LCDR, and for those excluded, 81.7
percent (.152/. 186) promoted.
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In general, the composition of the excluded subset is fairly similar to the
population in the analysis with the exception of commissioning source. USNA graduates
represent 42.7% of the officers in this study, but they make up only 17.9% of the officers
in the excluded subset. Also, OCS graduates represent only 27.8 percent of the officers in
the study, but are 52.7 percent of the officers in the excluded subset. NROTC and
NESEP graduates are evenly distributed between the two subsets. With the exception of
commissioning source, there appears to be no serious representation problems in using the
data file, particularly for the principle variables of interest, college quality, college major
and college grades. It is the objective of this study to examine what type of student from
the various commissioning sources will perform well as a submarine officer, not to
determine which commissioning source provides the best preparation. Commissioning
source is mainly included in the study as an important control variable. Also, the
distributions of the dependent variables are similar with the exception of "Retention" and
"Promotion." As explained in footnote 20, the promotion rates are similar, but the
retention rate of those excluded is much lower than those included in this study. As Table
3 . 1 indicates, there are no large differences in background characteristics, but those who
are less likely to remain in the Navy are more likely to be excluded from this study.
Only officers who were commissioned as a submariner are included in the analysis.
Although only 315 officers (8.8 percent), transferred into the submarine community after
commissioning, the intent of this study is to analyze the effect of academic background on
just the officers who were initially recruited to be submarine officers, testing the submarine
force's initial screening policies.
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Measuring the likelihood of completing the nuclear training pipeline is based on the
assumption that an officer who transferred out of the submarine community between the
commissioning date and the date of the 0-3 board, at approximately three years-of-
service, failed to complete the nuclear training pipeline. This assumption should hold true
for most of the officers who transferred to other communities.
The model that measures an officer's performance as a LT (0-3) suffers from
additional missing values. The fitness reports selected for inclusion in the analysis are
restricted to those that indicate "periodic" or "detachment of reporting senior" in the block
for occasion, "regular" in the block for type of report, and "close" in the block for the
basis of the reporting senior's observation of the officer. These restrictions ensure that
officers in the sample were evaluated against all their peers in the command, and that they
worked closely with the reporting senior officer, which reveals a more accurate picture of
the officer's true performance.
21 An analysis of the observations with missing fitness
report information indicates that there is little or no systematic relationship with any of the
explanatory variables. There is, however, a significant relationship with the other
dependent variables. Table 3.2 provides a comparison of mean values for the 2599
officers included in the 0-3 performance model to the 477 officers excluded due to
missing fitness report information.
Only 8.8 percent of officers with missing 0-3 fitness report information remained
until their 0-4 board, compared to 50.4 percent of officers with information. It is likely
21
This process results in 477 of 3076 submarine LT's (15.5 percent) being excluded from the study.
47
Table 3.2 Comparison of Means for Submariners Included in the Performance
Model to those Excluded from this Model (provided due to additional exclusions
from those displayed in Table 3.1)
Explanatory Submariners included in Submariners excluded due
Variable model (N=2599) to missing values (N=477)
Demographics
>2 years enlisted experience .095 .065
Minority .026 .025
Undergraduate Major
Biology/Physical Sciences .201 .254
Math/Computer Science .094 .094
Engineering .623 .597










High Selectivity .400 .423
Medium Selectivity .307 .255
Low Selectivity .293 .322
For OCS Graduates:
High Selectivity .165 .164
Medium Selectivity .385 .444
Low Selectivity .450 .392
Academic Achievement
GPA (top three categories)
5: 3.60-4.00 .174 .153
4: 3.20-3.59 .323 .365
3: 2.60-3.19 .445 .434
Dependent Variables
"Graduate" 1.00 1.00




Promotion rate of those who stayed until the 0-4 board equals PROMOTE / RETAIN. Therefore, for
those included in the model, 82.3 percent (.415/.504) promoted to LCDR, and for those excluded. 40.9
percent (036/.088) promoted. Because promotion decisions are based partly upon fitness report
evaluations, officers with no valid 0-3 fitness reports are less likely to be selected for promotion.
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that for many of those excluded, their 0-3 fitness report information is missing simply
because they did not stay until the 0-4 board. Many of those who left the Navy after their
initial service obligation did not receive a "valid" 0-3 fitness report. As discussed above,
only "valid" fitness reports (those on which the officer was compared against other
officers and had close contact with the reporting senior) are included in this study. Of
those who stayed until their 0-4 board, 40.9 percent of those without 0-3 fitness report
information promoted to LCDR, compared to 82.3 percent of those with information.
Due to a low correlation between missing 0-3 fitness report information and the
explanatory variables, and to prevent overly small sample sizes, no officers are excluded
from the other models based on missing 0-3 fitness report information.
The criterion for Y=l in the "Performance" model requires that an officer be
recommended for accelerated promotion (RAP'd) on greater than 75 percent of his 0-3
fitness reports. The officers included in this model received an average of 4.3 valid 0-3
fitness reports, and therefore, in order to meet the 75 percent criterion, an officer must
have been RAP'd on three out of the four valid reports. 75 percent is selected as the
threshold for this model because approximately half of the officers meet this criterion.
Figure 3.1 provides a graphic representation of the major points of career
progression in the submarine community and a summary of the data used in this study.
The database used in this study includes 4,526 officers who were commissioned into the
submarine community from 1977 to 1985. Of those, 3,567 are included in this study. 491
(14 percent) failed to complete the nuclear training pipeline and transferred to other
communities. Of those who successfully completed the training pipeline, 1818 (59
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percent) left the Navy prior to their 0-4 board. And, of the 1,258 who remained until the
0-4 board, 1,03 1 (82 percent) successfully promoted to LCDR.
491 (14%) to 1818(59%)







^ 1031 (82%)\ Promote to LCDR
\227(18%)
Fail to Promote
Figure 3.1 Career Progression in the Submarine Community
B. METHODOLOGY
This study utilizes four multivariate models to analyze various aspects of the
submarine community's career progression. Because each model has a dichotomous
dependent variable, a nonlinear maximum-likelihood probit procedure is used. The probit
procedure constrains the predicted values to the measured unit interval of zero to one and
calculates the effect of the explanatory variables on the probability of the selected
outcome. The probit uses the normal Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) in
estimating the model. Assume we let Y=l if the criteria for the dependent variable are
met, and Y=0 if the criteria are not met. There is an unobservable critical threshold level
index, call it I; , such that if L, the combined value of an individual's explanatory variables,
exceeds Ii\ the officer will meet the criteria for the dependent variable, otherwise he will
not. For a more complete discussion of the probit function, refer to any basic
econometrics textbook.
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The probit models measure the likelihood of: (1) completing the nuclear training
pipeline (Graduate); (2) being RAP'd on greater than 75 percent of one's 0-3 fitness
reports (Performance); (3) remaining until the 0-4 board for those who successfully
complete the training pipeline (Retention); and (4) promoting to LCDR for those
remaining until the 0-4 board (Promote). The analyses are performed on three groupings
of the population: (1) on the entire submariner population, (2) just OCS graduates, and (3)
on USNA and NROTC graduates in order to determine whether the effects of academic
background are different for OCS graduates than for USNA and NROTC graduates. The
expectation is that graduates from scholarship programs (USNA and NNROTC), who
made a commitment to the Navy upon entering college, are characteristically different
from those who were recruited (OCS) into the Navy. Table 3.3 provides a complete
description of the dependent variables used in the models.
Table 3.3. Description of Dependent Variables
Variable Description
GRADUATE = 1 if officer completed the nuclear training pipeline.
= otherwise.
PERFORMANCE = 1 if officer was recommended for accelerated promotion
on greater than 75 percent of his 0-3 fitness reports (of
those who completed the training pipeline). 23
= otherwise.
RETENTION = 1 if the officer remained in the Navy and the submarine
community until the 0-4 board (ofthose who completed the
training pipeline).
= otherwise.
PROMOTE = 1 if the officer promoted to LCDR (of those who remain
until the 0-4 board).
= otherwise.
23 The officers in this study received an average of 4.32 valid 0-3 fitness reports. Therefore, on average,
an officer may only fail to be RAP'd on one 0-3 fitness report in order to meet the criteria for "superior"
performance.
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Figure 3.2 displays the percentage of officers in each model and population subset
who meet the criteria for Y=l for each dependent variable.
Percentage of Officers Meeting Dependent Variable













Figure 3.2 The Percentage of Officers Meeting Dependent Variable Criteria (for
Y=l) by Population Subset
The independent variables of interest are commissioning source, college quality,
undergraduate major, and college grades. Additional control variables are included to
control for prior enlisted experience, ethnicity, and the year of commissioning. The
intention of the commissioning year variable is to control for varying environment in the
submarine community with respect to fitness reports, retention, and promotion to LCDR.
Commissioning year is calculated by subtracting four years form the fiscal year of the
officer's 0-3 board. This calculation is necessary due to unreliable information for
commissioning year in the database. Ethnicity is controlled through the variable
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"Minority" which equals one if the officer is a minority (on the basis of race), or zero if the
officer is Caucasian. "Greater than two years of enlisted experience" indicates whether or
not an officer has greater than two years of prior enlisted experience.
Undergraduate majors are grouped into six categories: Biology and Physical
Sciences, Mathematics and Computer Science, Engineering, Social Sciences, Management
and Economics, and the Humanities. Grades are estimated through the use of the
military's Academic Profile Code 1 (APC1). APC1 ranges from zero for the highest grade
point averages to five for the lowest averages. In this study, grades are estimated through
the variable GPA = (5-APC1), so that five is assigned to the highest grades category and
zero to the lowest.
The military uses Academic Profile Codes to aid in screening officers for selection
to postgraduate education programs. APC2, the Math Qualification Code, measures the
quantity and quality of math education received by an officer and APC3, the Technical
Qualification Code, measures the quantity and quality of education in engineering and
physics received by the officer. APC2 ranges from zero for the highest measure of math
education to six for the lowest. APC3 ranges from zero to five. In this study, the
variables "Math Proficiency" and "Technical Proficiency" are used. "Math Proficiency" =
(6-APC2) and "Technical Proficiency" = (5-APC3). They are included in the study to
capture the scope of an individual's technical education as an undergraduate. 24
24 As expected, "Math Proficiency" and "Technical Proficiency" correlate with an officer's undergraduate
major. However, the level of correlation is not as much as one might expect. The models are analyzed
three ways: (1) with both Undergraduate Major, and "Math Proficiency" and "Technical Proficiency"
included, (2) Undergraduate Major only, and (3) "Math Proficiency" and "Technical Proficiency" only.
The models with all three variables provided decidedly better estimates of the probability of the criteria for
the dependent variable being met.
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= 1 if officer is a biology, physical sciences, or related major
= 1 if officer is a math, computer science, or related major
= 1 if officer is an engineering major
= 1 if officer is a social sciences major
= 1 if officer is a management, economics, or related major






















Measure ofquantity and quality ofmath education:
no math with C grade
at least one pre-calculus course with C grade
at least two pre-calculus courses with B+ average or better
one calculus course with C grade or better
two or more calculus courses with C+ average
two or more calculus courses with B+ average







Measure ofquantity and quality ofphysics and engineering
courses:
no courses in lower division calculus-based physics
at least one course in lower division calculus-based physics
with C grade
Complete sequence (lower division calculus-based physics)
taken with C+ average
Complete sequence (lower division calculus-based physics)
taken with B+ average
Upper division courses in engineering/physical science
major with C+ average
Upper division courses in engineering/physical science





USNA =1 if commissioned through the U.S. Naval Academy
= otherwise
NROTC high selectivity = 1 if commissioned through NROTC at school in Barron's




= 1 if commissioned through NROTC at school in Barron's
Category 3
= otherwise
NROTC low selectivity = 1 if commissioned through NROTC at school in Barron's
Categories 4 through 7
= otherwise
OCS high selectivity = 1 if commissioned through OCS and attended an
undergraduate school in Barron's Categories 1 or 2
= otherwise
OCS medium selectivity = 1 if commissioned through OCS and attended an
undergraduate school in Barron's Category 3
= otherwise
OCS low selectivity = 1 if commissioned through OCS and attended an
undergraduate school in Barron's Categories 4 through 7
= otherwise












= 1 if commissioned in fiscal year 1977
= 1 if commissioned in fiscal year 1978
= 1 if commissioned in fiscal year 1979
= 1 if commissioned in fiscal year 1980
= 1 if commissioned in fiscal year 1981
= 1 if commissioned in fiscal year 1982
= 1 if commissioned in fiscal year 1983
= 1 if commissioned in fiscal year 1984
= 1 if commissioned in fiscal year 1985
Demographics
>2 years enlisted experience = 1 if officer has two or more years of prior enlisted
experience
= otherwise
Minority = 1 if officer is a racial minority
= if Caucasian
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College quality is estimated through the use of Barron's Profiles of American
Colleges , which rates each college in the nation on an index of selectivity. Barron's index
lists seven categories of selectivity with Category 1 meaning the most selective and 6
indicating the least selective. Category 7 consists of schools such as Art and Divinity
Schools, which are not classified on the basis of selectivity. This study divides the schools
into three categories called High, Medium, and Low. High refers to a highly selective
school (Barron's Categories 1 or 2) and consists of schools such as Harvard or UC
Berkeley; Medium (Barron's Category 3) generally consists of large state universities; and
Low (Barron's Categories 4 to 7) refers to schools with open admissions or relatively low
entrance standards. College quality and commissioning source (NROTC and OCS) are
combined to capture interactions between the two measures.
Table 3.5 lists the expected effects of important explanatory variables. It i
expected that engineering majors will fare the best on performance measures due to
greater specific training (technical training) that is useful to the submarine force. It is
uncertain what effect major will have on "Retention." Two opposing effects exist.
Typically engineering majors earn the most money in the civilian workplace and therefore
officers with engineering majors may choose to leave the Navy due to greater civilian
employment opportunities. However, engineering majors may enjoy greater job
satisfaction in the submarine force due to greater specific training and therefore will
choose to remain in the Navy.
It is expected that officers with better grades will perform better on the measures
of performance due to greater capability, but will be more likely to leave the Navy due to
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greater civilian employment opportunities. Higher quality schools will have the same
effect.
USNA is expected to have a positive effect on both performance and retention due
to greater amounts of Navy-specific training and a displayed propensity towards a career
in the Navy. Because NESEP graduates are mostly prior enlisted members, it is expected
that they will perform better and be more likely to remain in the Navy than USNA
graduates. They have been hand-picked from the enlisted ranks to become an officer after
displaying traits considered important towards success as an officer. Also, they are closer
to reaching 20 years of service (point of voluntary retirement with benefits) and therefore
are more likely to remain in the Navy.
Table 3.5 Expected Effects of Selected Explanatory Variables
Variable Expected Effect on Expected Effect on
Performance Measures Retention
Undergraduate Maior
(with respect to Engineering)
Biology/Physical Sciences negative Uncertain
Math/Computer Science negative Uncertain












Medium selectivity negative Positive




This study finds that all of the explanatory variables of interest—undergraduate
major, grades, commissioning source, and college quality—affect submariner performance
and retention. This chapter discusses the results of the multivariate models, presenting the
marginal effect
25
of each explanatory variable on each of the dependent variables.
Complete results, including the probit estimate and chi-square value for each variable are
presented in Appendix A. Marginal effects are only calculated for variables that are
significant at the .10 level or better. Blank values in this chapter's tables indicate that the
variable's effect on that particular dependent variable is insignificant, but the variable is
still included in the model.
The results are organized according to "groups" of explanatory variables. The
effects for a type of explanatory variable (e.g., undergraduate major) are presented first for
the combined population, then separately for OCS graduates, and for USNA and NROTC
graduates combined. These sub-samples are created to determine whether the effects of
academic background variables are different for OCS graduates than for USNA and
NROTC graduates. In this chapter, the term "scholarship graduates" refers to USNA and
NROTC graduates. USNA and NROTC graduates enter college with a full scholarship by
the Navy contingent upon commitment to serve in the Navy for five years following
graduation.
25
Calculated by multiplying the estimated coefficient by the density of the standard normal distribution
function corresponding to the particular probability level, as given by the cumulative normal distribution
function for which the change is being evaluated. (Gunderson, 1980)
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Each table lists the effects for a group of explanatory variables on all four
dependent variables. Additionally, graphs display the effect of grades on the dependent
variables for each of the three analyses. Explanatory variables are listed in order of
importance to this study, starting with undergraduate major, followed by grades,
commissioning source interacted with college quality, and demographic characteristics.
Marginal effects are not calculated for commissioning year control variables, but their
level-of-significance and probit estimates are listed in Appendix A. Also listed in
Appendix A are the mean values of the various explanatory variables used to calculate the
marginal effects. Appendix B provides a more complete listing of the distribution of
officers among the various categories including the actual number and percentage of
officers in each category. Given the heavily skewed distribution towards higher grades
and technical majors (particularly engineering majors), it is important to consider the
number of officers in each category when analyzing the results of this study.
A. UNDERGRADUATE MAJOR
Table 4.1 shows that undergraduate major significantly affects the likelihood of
remaining in the Navy and of completing the nuclear training pipeline. However, it has
little effect on performance on 0-3 fitness reports or promotion. For the combined
population, undergraduate major is either negative or insignificant (compared to an
engineering major), indicating that engineering majors fare well in all categories. Math
and management majors fare the worst, with negative effects on two of the four dependent
variables. Math is the only major that is statistically significant for identifying performance
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as a LT (0-3). It has a strong negative effect. Management major has the strongest
negative effect on retention, perhaps indicating that officers with a management major find
prospects in the civilian workforce more appealing than the Navy. It is not certain if
management majors have greater general training which is more appealing to civilian
employers than other majors, or if they find the worst "fit" with a Navy career.
Interestingly, the effect of humanities major is insignificant for all dependent variables
indicating that humanities majors fare as well as engineering majors in all categories. It is
important to note that the humanities major is the smallest category in the combined
population, represented by only two to three percent of the population. The insignificance
is due in part to the small number of officers with a humanities major, but it is apparent
that humanities majors performed as well as engineering majors in this study.
The results indicate that undergraduate major has a much different effect among
OCS graduates than among scholarship graduates. Non-technical majors (social sciences,
management, and humanities) have a strong positive effect on retention among OCS
graduates, but a strong negative effect among scholarship graduates. As discussed in
Chapter II, OCS graduates committed to the Navy during their junior year of college or
later. Therefore, they selected the Navy over other potential employers. It is possible that
many OCS graduates selected the Navy due to poor civilian job prospects. 26 Perhaps OCS
graduates with non-technical majors were faced with the least appealing civilian job
26 The reader should keep in mind that this study analyzes officers who entered the Navy from 1977 to
1985. Unemployment rates were much higher during this period than now, and college graduates did not
have the tremendous range of employment options that are currently available to graduates.
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prospects, and found the Navy to provide a suitable alternative, even after five years of
service in the Navy.
Also, non-technical majors have a strong negative effect on completing the nuclear
training pipeline among scholarship graduates, but no major has a significant effect among
OCS graduates. The insignificance of major is due in part to little variation in the
dependent variable. In this study, 92.5 percent of OCS graduates successfully completed
the nuclear training pipeline, ranging from 268 (91.2 percent) of the biology/physical
sciences majors to all 12 (100 percent) of the social sciences majors and all 16 (100
percent) of the management majors. 83.6 percent of scholarship graduates completed the
nuclear training pipeline. In this study, OCS graduates have higher grades than
scholarship graduates do, possibly indicating greater academic capability and therefore
greater likelihood of completing the training pipeline. 25.9 percent of OCS graduates
have greater than a 3.60 college GPA and 69.4 percent have greater than a 3.20 college
GPA. This is compare to 12.2 percent and 40.1 percent of scholarship graduates.
OCS graduates with a math major fared the worst on 0-3 fitness reports and
appear to be the reason for the negative effect observed in the combined population. As
shown in Table 4.1, math major is the only major with a statistically significant effect on
"performance" in the combined and OCS population; however, no major has a significant
effect among scholarship graduates. As shown in Appendix B, math majors make up
approximately 10 percent of the population in all of the models. Again, it is interesting to
note the effect of humanities major. Among OCS graduates, humanities majors are more
likely to remain in the Navy and enjoy better promotion rates than engineering majors do.
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It is the only major that has a statistically significant effect on promotion. No other major,
in any ofthe analyses, has a significant effect on promotion.
Table 4.1. Marginal Effects of Undergraduate Major (with respect to ENGINEER)




















Social Sciences -0.12 -0.11
Management/Economics -0.15 -0.23
Humanities -0.21
1. Effects calculated only for variables significant to at least the . 10 level. Blank values indicate that the
effect is insignificant.
2. Appendix A lists mean values used to calculate marginal effects, probit estimates, chi-square values
and level-of-significance, and marginal effects.
In general, the three analyses indicate that undergraduate major is an important
factor in explaining retention decisions and the likelihood of completing the nuclear
training pipeline, but that major has an insignificant effect on performance as a junior
officer or promotion to LCDR. Among scholarship graduates, it is apparent that an
engineering major prepares an officer to complete the nuclear training pipeline and that
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officers with engineering majors find a good "fit" with the submarine community. Among
OCS graduates, non-technical majors are more likely to remain in the Navy. The
insignificance of undergraduate major in determining likelihood of completing the nuclear
training pipeline is partly due to little variation in the dependent variable, given that 92.5
percent ofOCS graduates successfully complete the training pipeline.
B. COLLEGE GRADES (GPA)
The effect of college GPA, as shown in Table 4.2, provides some of the most
interesting and surprising results in this study. The measures of "Math Proficiency" and
"Technical Proficiency" are not included on Table 4.2. These measures are not the focus
of this thesis, but are included in the models because they improve the ability ofthe models
to predict the likelihood of the dependent variables. The probit estimates for these two
measures are listed in Appendix A. "Math Proficiency" has a statistically significant
negative effect on "Retention" for the combined and scholarship graduate sub-samples,
but an insignificant effect on all other measures. "Technical Proficiency" has a statistically
significant negative effect on "Retention" for OCS graduates, but is insignificant for all
other measures.
For the combined population, and for scholarship graduates, grades have a positive
effect on all four dependent variables and a particularly strong effect on the probability of
promotion. For OCS graduates, grades have a statistically significant positive effect on
retention and promotion probability, but an insignificant effect on performance on 0-3
fitness reports and the likelihood of completing the nuclear training pipeline. Again, little
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variation in the dependent variable affects the significance among OCS graduates. Only
7.5 percent OCS graduates fail to complete the nuclear training pipeline, and only 31.8
percent remain in the Navy until the 0-4 board.








5: 3.60-4.00 0.02 0.06 0.05 0.06
4: 3.20-3.59 0.03 0.06 0.05 0.09
3:2.60-3.19 0.03 0.06 0.05 0.12
2: 2.20-2.59 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.14




5: 3.60-4.00 0.05 0.07
4: 3.20-3.59 0.05 0.10
3:2.60-3.19 0.05 0.12
2: 2.20-2.59 0.04 0.12




5: 3.60-4.00 0.03 0.06 0.05 0.05
4: 3.20-3.59 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.09
3:2.60-3.19 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.12
2: 2.20-2.59 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.14




Effects calculated only for variables significant to at least the . 10 level. Blank values indicate that the
effect is insignificant.
Appendix A lists mean values used to calculate marginal effects, probit estimates, chi-square values
and level-of-significance, and marginal effects.
The listed marginal effects represent the change in probability of the dependent variable when GPA
changes from one category to the next. For example, in the combined population, as GPA increases
from Category 4 (3.20-3.59) to Category 5 (3.60-4.00), the probability of promoting to LCDR
increases by six percentage points.
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Of note is the fact that GPA has a positive effect on retention for all submarine
officers. Assuming that students with higher grades have greater employment
opportunities available to them, this result suggests that individuals select a career on the
basis of utility not just earnings. As discussed in Chapter n, individuals choose careers
based on job satisfaction and other forms of intrinsic rewards such as respect earned,
power, and the joy involved in doing what one considers important, as well as on financial
considerations.
Presumably, more able officers (with higher grades) can earn greater financial
rewards in the civilian workforce than other officers, but these more able officers are also
more likely to be successful in the Navy. Perhaps, as grades improve, indicating greater
motivation and/or cognitive skills, officers find greater satisfaction in the submarine force
than they expect to find in a civilian job, which leads them to forego the potential of
greater financial rewards in another job. This greater satisfaction could be due to the fact
that the more capable and motivated the officer is, the more success he will enjoy on the
job, and the less frustration he will experience.
Also interesting is the fact that the effect of GPA is linearly related to
"Performance" and "Retention," but that the relationship is non-linear for "Graduate" and
"Promotion." The reason for this result is not clear. Again, it is important to consider the
distribution of officers across the various categories. As shown in Appendix B, well over
90 percent of submarine officers have higher than a 2.60 GPA, making up the top three
categories of GPA, and fewer than one percent possess lower than a 2.20 GPA which
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makes up the bottom two categories of GPA. Also, OCS graduates tend to have higher
grades than scholarship graduates.
Figures 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3 graphically display the effect of GPA on the four
dependent variables. As noted before, GPA is linearly related to "Performance" and
"Retention", whereas the relationship is non-linear for "Graduate" and "Promotion."






-1.89 1.90-2.19 2.20-2.59 2.60-3.19 3.20-3.59 3.60-4.00
Grade Point Average
Figure 4.1 The Effect of GPA on Four Performance Measures for the Combined
Population
Among OCS graduates, college GPA is only significant in explaining performance
on 0-3 fitness reports and promotion to LCDR. Figure 4.2 graphically displays the effect
of GPA on "Performance" and "Promotion." For scholarship graduates, GPA has a
statistically significant effect on all four performance measures. Figure 4.3 graphically
displays the effect ofGPA on the dependent variables.
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Figure 4.2 The Effect of GPA on Four Performance Measures for OCS Graduates
The Effect of Grades on Percent Probabilities
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3.60-4.00
Figure 4.3 The Effect of GPA on Four Performance Measures for USNA and
NROTC Graduates
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C. COMMISSIONING SOURCE AND COLLEGE QUALITY
As shown in Table 4.3, commissioning source and college quality significantly
affect submariner performance and retention. The two variables are interacted to
specifically describe an officer's source. For example, rather than just indicating an officer
is from the NROTC or OCS program, the interaction term allows the reader to see the
effect of an officer coming from a NROTC program at a highly selective institution.
Again, the objective of this thesis is to identify which officers (based on information
available to recruiters) are likely to perform well as submariners and remain in the Navy.
It is not of interest (in this study) to determine the effect of an individual commissioning
source, but rather to determine the combined effect of commissioning source and college
quality. However, from the results it is possible to approximate the relative effects of
commissioning source and college quality.
The effect of commissioning source is evident by examining the overall NROTC
and OCS results. In general, OCS graduates are more likely to complete the nuclear
training pipeline than NROTC and USNA graduates, but are less likely to perform well on
0-3 fitness reports and less likely to remain in the Navy. There is no discernible difference
between NROTC and OCS graduates for the probability of promoting to LCDR, but
graduates ofboth commissioning sources are less likely to promote than USNA graduates.
Also, both NROTC and OCS graduates perform worse on 0-3 fitness reports and are less
likely to remain in the Navy than USNA graduates. The effect ofNESEP is insignificant
on all measures, except for a positive effect on "Retention." Because NESEP graduates
are mostly prior enlisted members, it is not surprising that NESEP has a positive effect on
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"Retention." NESEP graduates are closer to reaching 20 years of service in the Navy (the
point of voluntary retirement with benefits) and they chose to become officers after
experiencing Navy life as an enlisted person. Therefore, they chose to become a
submarine officer with greater knowledge ofwhat to expect from the future.
The effect of college quality is important to the Navy because it is more expensive
to send NROTC candidates to, and recruit OCS candidates from, more selective
institutions. College quality's effect on the dependent variables can be estimated by
comparing the individual marginal effects of officers within one commissioning source
category. For example, among OCS graduates, compare the difference between marginal
effects for "high selectivity," "medium selectivity," and "low selectivity." This analysis
indicates that OCS graduates from more selective institutions are more likely to perform
well ("Graduate," "Performance," and "Promotion"), and are less likely to remain in the
Navy ("Retention") than OCS graduates from less selective institutions. NROTC
graduates from more selective institutions also are more likely to perform well than those
from less selective institutions, but are equally likely to remain in the Navy. It is possible
that college quality has a lesser impact on retention rates among NROTC graduates
(compared to OCS graduates) due to a greater propensity towards service in the Navy.
NROTC graduates committed to service in the Navy as they entered college whereas OCS
graduates did not commit until their junior year of college or later. Again, it is important
to consider the distribution of officers among the various categories. As displayed in
Appendix B, NROTC graduates tend to come from more selective institutions with
approximately 40 percent falling into the "high selectivity" category. The opposite is true
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for OCS graduates. Nearly 50 percent of OCS graduates fall into the "low selectivity"
category.
Table 4.3 Marginal Effects of Commissioning Source and College Quality on Four





Combined Population (with respect to USNA)
NROTC high selectivity -0.06 -0.10
NROTC medium selectivity 0.04 -0.09
NROTC low selectivity -0.10 -0.10 -0.08
OCS high selectivity 0.13 -0.01 -0.21
OCS medium selectivity 0.10 -0.10 -0.21 -0.07
OCS low selectivity 0.08 -0.17 -0.13 -0.12
NESEP 0.15
OCS Graduates Only (with respect to High Selectivity)
OCS medium selectivity
OCS low selectivity -0.03 0.08
USNA andNROTC Graduates (with respect to USNA)
NROTC high selectivity -0.09
NROTC medium selectivity 0.05 -0.09
NROTC low selectivity 0.04 -0.09 -0.09 -0.08
1
.
Effects calculated only for variables significant to at least the . 10 level. Blank values indicate that the
effect is insignificant.
2. Appendix A lists mean values used to calculate marginal effects, probit estimates, chi-square values
and level-of-significance, and marginal effects.
D. DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES
Finally, the effects of the demographic variables, prior enlisted experience and
ethnicity, are listed in Table 4.4. Prior enlisted officers make up approximately ten percent
of the combined population, ranging from two percent for scholarship graduates to
approximately 20 percent of OCS graduates. Very few submarine officers are a racial
minority, making up only two to three percent of the population in all analyses.
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Generally, officers with prior enlisted experience are more likely to perform well
on 0-3 fitness reports and stay in the Navy; however, prior enlisted experience does not
have a statistically significant effect on the probability of promotion to LCDR. It is not
surprising that prior enlisted officers perform better on 0-3 fitness reports due to the fact
that they have greater "naval" experience. It is expected that they are more likely to
remain in the Navy because they made the choice to enter a commissioning program after
becoming familiar with life in the Navy. Also, they are closer to achieving 20 years in the
Navy (the point of voluntary retirement) than other officers. Apparently the positive effect
of prior enlisted experience is negligible after ten years of commissioned sendee, as
evidence by the insignificant effect on promotion probability. It can be expected that after
ten years in the Navy, other officers without enlisted experience have acquired the Navy-
specific knowledge necessary to perform as well as officers with enlisted experience.
Curiously, prior enlisted officers from USNA and NROTC are less likely to complete the
nuclear training pipeline than those without enlisted experience; whereas, OCS graduates
with enlisted experience are more likely to complete the training pipeline. The reason for
this effect is not known.
Minority status is only significant among OCS graduates. It has a statistically
significant negative effect on "Performance" and "Retention," but is insignificant for all
other measures. Among OCS graduates, minorities are less likely to perform well on 0-3
fitness reports and are less likely to remain in the Navy. The effect of minority status is
not the focus of this thesis, but is included as a standard demographic control variable.
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Table 4.4. Marginal Effects of Demographic Variables on Four Performance




Graduate Performance Retention Promote
Combined Population














Effects calculated only for variables significant to at least the . 10 level. Blank values indicate that the
effect is insignificant.
2. Appendix A lists mean values used to calculate marginal effects, probit estimates, chi-square values
and level-of-significance, and marginal effects.
In summary, a strong academic background, as evidenced by good grades, leads to
higher completion rates through the nuclear training pipeline, better performance on 0-3
fitness reports, and higher retention and promotion rates. Undergraduate major can be
used to predict officer performance and retention decisions on an aggregate level.
Technical aptitude appears to be beneficial, as engineering majors fare well on all four
performance measures. However, it seems that it is the type of person that selects various
majors, not technical aptitude, that is the most important factor. As evidence, math
majors, though considered to possess a high degree of technical aptitude, fare the worst. 27
Math majors obviously possess great proficiency in math-related subjects, but do not necessarily receive
schooling in engineering-related subjects, which provide knowledge useful toward understanding nuclear
power. The U.S. Naval Academy groups its mathematics major with physics, chemistry, oceanography,
and computer science as Category II majors. Engineering majors (these include aerospace, astrospace,
electrical, mechanical, marine, ocean, systems, and naval architecture) are listed as a Category I major.
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They are less likely to remain in the Navy and they perform worse on 0-3 fitness reports
than engineering majors. It is the only major than has a statistically significant effect on
performance as an 0-3. Among OCS graduates, non-technical majors have the highest
retention rates. Humanities majors have higher retention and promotion rates than
engineering majors do.
Officers from the Naval Academy fare better on all performance measures except
"Graduate." Among OCS and NROTC graduates, college selectivity is an important
factor. In both cases, graduates from more selective institutions are more likely to
perform well on 0-3 fitness reports and are more likely to promote to LCDR. For OCS
graduates, higher selectivity leads to worse retention rates, but for NROTC graduates,
selectivity does not have a strong effect on retention decisions.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This chapter summarizes the conclusions drawn from the empirical analysis of this
thesis. The chapter also proposes recommendations for further research into the effects of
academic background on officer performance, and concludes with a discussion of the
policy implications associated with this study's results.
A. CONCLUSIONS
In general, the results of this study support the emphasis that the submarine
community places on selecting officers with stellar academic records and proven technical
aptitude. Of all the naval communities, the submarine force is the only community that has
the luxury to select which officers it desires based on academic background. Given the
highly skewed distribution of submarine officers weighted towards engineering majors and
good grades, it is encouraging to note that these factors (engineering majors and good
grades) have a positive effect on virtually all measures of performance. In fact, the effects
of other undergraduate majors are either negative or insignificant (compared to an
engineering major) in all cases with the exception that OCS graduates with non-technical
and biology/physical sciences majors are more likely to remain in the Navy. As noted
before, the positive effect of GPA on retention decisions is both surprising and exciting.
GPA has a positive effect in all cases with the exception of an insignificant effect on
"Graduate" and "Performance" for OCS graduates. Not only is the submarine force able
to select the more capable officers (capability based on college grades), but is able to keep
them in the Navy too.
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To summarize the results, a strong academic background, as evidenced by good
grades, leads to higher completion rates through the nuclear training pipeline, better
performance on 0-3 fitness reports, and better retention and promotion rates. GPA has a
particularly strong positive effect on the probability of promoting to LCDR. For OCS
graduates, grades have a statistically significant positive effect in all cases with the
exception of an insignificant effect on the likelihood of completing the nuclear training
pipeline and performance on 0-3 fitness reports.
Undergraduate major can be used to predict officer performance and retention
decisions on an aggregate level. Technical aptitude appears to be beneficial, as
engineering majors fare well on all four performance measures. However, math majors
fare the worst. They are less likely to remain in the Navy and they perform worse on 0-3
fitness reports than engineering majors. It is the only major that has a statistically
significant effect on performance as an 0-3. It has a strong negative effect. Among OCS
graduates, non-technical majors have the highest retention rates and no major has a
statistically significant effect on completing the nuclear training pipeline. Humanities
majors have better retention and promotion rates than engineering majors do. The effect
is opposite for scholarship graduates. For the USNA and NROTC subset, non-technical
and math majors have the worst retention rates; and biology/physical sciences, social
sciences, and management/economics majors have the worst training pipeline completion
rates.
The findings suggest that the submarine force should continue to emphasize good
grades and a strong technical background. On the other hand, non-technical majors from
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the NUPOC program (OCS graduates) have compared favorably to engineering majors in
both "Performance" and "Retention." They should not be excluded from recruiting
efforts. Vice Admiral McGann, Commander Naval Recruiting Command (CNRC),
recently directed NUPOC recruiters to extend their recruiting efforts beyond the usual
search for college students in technical majors. The results of this thesis support a policy
that encourages efforts to recruit non-technical majors into the NUPOC program.
The positive effect of an engineering major and good grades on measures of officer
performance ("Graduate," "Performance," and "Promotion") support labor economics
theories which state that investments in human capital (in this case evidenced by
undergraduate major and level of GPA) lead to greater worker productivity. Additionally,
it is apparent that engineering majors receive training that is useful as a submarine officer.
However, it is unclear whether the positive effect of an engineering major and good grades
on "Retention" is due to intrinsic rewards such as job satisfaction, a better "fit" with the
submarine lifestyle, or some other unobserved factors. It is expected that officers with
good grades, especially those with technical majors, have greater employment
opportunities available to them in the civilian workforce, and will therefore be more likely
to leave the Navy. However, the opposite is true. Good grades lead to higher retention
rates.
Commissioning source and college selectivity significantly affect all four
performance measures. Officers from the Naval Academy fare better on all performance
measures except "Graduate." USNA graduates are more likely to perform well and are
more likely to remain in the Navy than both NROTC and OCS graduates. NROTC
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graduates perform slightly better than OCS graduates and also are slightly more likely to
remain in the Navy. It is assumed that USNA graduates incur the greatest amount of
specific training that is useful as a naval officer. Therefore, according to labor economics
theory, it is not surprising that they perform better, and it can be expected that they will be
more likely to remain in the Navy. Not only did they evince a propensity to serve in the
Navy upon graduation from high school; but, having received the greatest amount of firm-
specific training, human capital theory states that their earnings potential (or job
productivity) is greatest with the Navy, relative to NROTC and OCS graduates.
Among OCS and NROTC graduates, college selectivity is an important factor. In
both cases, graduates from more selective institutions are more likely to perform well on
0-3 fitness reports and are more likely to promote to LCDR. For OCS graduates, higher
selectivity leads to lower retention rates, but for NROTC graduates, selectivity does not
have a strong effect on retention decisions. Also, for OCS graduates, greater selectivity
leads to higher training pipeline completion rates. It has little effect on NROTC
graduates' probability of completing the training pipeline.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
Given the highly academic nature of the process used to select candidates into the
submarine force, it is expected that the variables used in this thesis are the most important
in identifying future success. However, there are many other factors that are likely
important in identifying officer candidates who are likely to perform well as submariners.
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It would be interesting, and of possible importance, to analyze the effects of other college
characteristics, such as participation in athletics or other extracurricular activities.
Other studies, which analyzed the effects of an array of characteristics on officer
performance, have found a strong correlation between non-academic characteristics and
performance. For example, Matt Reardon (1997), analyzed the criteria that the Naval
Academy uses to select which high school students to offer admission. Despite the
academy's heavy reliance on academic measures as screening tools, Reardon found that
factors such as participation in varsity athletics and leadership roles in other
extracurricular activities had greater impact on performance as a midshipman and as an
officer than academic measures did. In fact, achievement of Eagle Scout status had the
strongest effect on future performance as an officer. Additionally, he analyzed the system
that the academy uses to determine class rank among midshipmen. Again it is heavily
weighted towards academic achievement, but he found that performance grades (a
measure of leadership ability, maturity, and many other factors important as an officer)
have a stronger correlation with future success as an officer than measures of academic
achievement did.
As stated several times, the purpose of this thesis is to test the submarine force's
policy of emphasizing a strong academic background and to provide recruiters with
information that can be used to identify candidates which are likely to perform well as
submarine officers In that light, it is not the objective of this thesis to isolate the effect of
self-selection bias. However, further research can utilize more sophisticated statistical
techniques in an attempt to isolate self-selection bias and determine if it has a significant
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effect on performance as an officer. Given the selective nature of the submarine
community, it is expected that self-selection bias has a statistically significant effect. Also,
further research is needed to analyze more recent year groups in order to determine if
academic achievement continues to be an important factor in identifying success as an
officer.
C. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
As stated before, the primary objective of this research is to provide NUPOC
recruiters with information that identifies what type of college student is well suited for
service in the submarine force. The results of this study accomplish this objective with
respect to an individual's academic background, but do not address other important
factors.
The strong positive effect of college GPA on all measures of performance supports
the submarine force's policy of emphasizing academic ability in the screening of
candidates. Surprising, and exciting, is the fact that GPA has a positive effect on retention
decisions. The submarine force is able to recruit and retain the officers who possess the
greatest academic ability. Also, the positive effect of engineering majors on most
performance measures supports the submarine force's emphasis on a strong technical
background. However, among OCS graduates, engineering majors are less likely to
remain in the Navy than non-technical majors are.
Some specific recommendations:
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• Broaden the scope of NUPOC recruiting efforts . Among OCS graduates, non-
technical majors compare favorably with engineering majors. Non-technical majors
are more likely to remain in the Navy and they perform equally well on the other
performance measures as indicated by the insignificant effect of non-technical majors
on "Graduate," "Performance," and "Promotion." Actually, humanities majors have a
statistically significant positive effect on "Retention" and "Promotion." Despite the
positive effect of non-technical majors, only 6.6 percent of the OCS graduates
analyzed in this study have non-technical majors.
• Provide a more realistic "job preview" to NUPOC candidates . The OCS graduates in
this study received only a one-day tour of a submarine base and a submarine. Despite
the fact that they would eventually spend 50 percent of their time at sea as submarine
officers, most of the OCS graduates had never been to sea on a Navy warship before
committing to five years of service in the Navy. A short period of time at sea, similar
to USNA and NROTC summer cruises, would provide NUPOC candidates with a
more accurate description of what it is like to be a submarine officer. It is likely that
this would result in higher retention rates among OCS graduates. It is even possible
that it could serve as a highly effective recruitment tool that increases the number of
college students who are interested in a career in the submarine force.
• Closer examination of mathematics and computer science majors . In this study,
despite the fact that math and computer science majors should possess the academic
aptitude to perform well as a submariner, it is the only undergraduate major category
with a negative effect on performance as an 0-3. Also, it is the only major category
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that does not have a statistically significant effect on "Retention" among OCS
graduates. All other categories of undergraduate major have a positive effect on
"Retention" with respect to engineering majors. Because math and computer science
majors meet the academic requirements for selection into the submarine force,
recruiters target these majors for potential NUPOC candidates. It is not certain why
math and computer science majors do not perform well in the submarine force, but an
in-depth analysis of these majors may provide some insight. Perhaps the typical
mathematics or computer science curricula provide inadequate preparation necessary
to succeed as a submarine officer.
• Increase commissioning opportunities for enlisted personnel . Prior enlisted experience
has a positive effect on performance as an 0-3 and on retention decisions. Prior
enlisted officers are more likely to perform well on 0-3 fitness reports and are more
likely to remain in the Navy than officers without significant enlisted experience are.
This result is not surprising considering prior enlisted officers are handpicked from
among the ranks of enlisted personnel. Under close observation as sailors, they have
displayed attributes that are desirable as an officer, and they have displayed a
propensity towards a career in the Navy.
This thesis provides information that can improve submarine force recruitment
efforts based on academic background, as well as recommendations for research to
improve recruitment efforts based on factors other than academic background. In general,
the results of this study support the submarine force's emphasis on good grades and a
strong technical background, but there are a few exceptions.
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APPENDIX A
Appendix A lists the empirical results of the statistical analyses. The tables on the
following pages list the mean values of the variables in each model, which are used to
calculate marginal effects. For example, when calculating the marginal effects of various
undergraduate majors, all other variables are held at the mean value and a one is inserted
for the major of interest and a zero in all of the other majors. Therefore, the marginal
effects represent the percentage point change in the dependent variable for a one-unit
change in each of the independent variables. Marginal effects are calculated only for
variables that are significant to at least the .10 level. Effects are not calculated for
commissioning year dummy variables (not of interest) and for "Math Proficiency" and
"Technical Proficiency." The effect of GPA is discussed at length in Chapter IV,
presenting the marginal effects over the range of possible values.
Also included on the tables are: the number of observations for each model; the
number of officers meeting the criteria for the dependent variable to equal one; and a
measure of model fit, Chi-Square, which measures the likelihood that the included
explanatory variables, in the aggregate, have a significant effect on the outcome of the
dependent variable.
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GPA (values range from to 5)
Math Proficiency (0 to 6)













3567 (Y=l for 3076 or 86.2 percent)
173.1 (p=0.0001)
1 *** Significant at the .01 level; ** Significant at the .05 level; * Significant at the . 10 level
2
Marginal effects only calculated for variables that are significant to at least the .10 level, and are not
calculated for commissioning year dummies. The marginal effect of GPA represents a change from Cat3
(2.6-3.2) to Cat4 (3.2-3.6) which is around the mean value. Effects are presented for the range of possible
GPA values in Chapter IV.
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Intercept 1 1.5088 7.5901 -
Demoeraphics
>2 years enlisted experience .1534 .7876 8.5792*** 0.05
Minority .0212 .1434 .0751 -
Undergraduate Major
(with respect to Engineering)
Biology/Physical Sciences .2967 -.1090 .5392 -
Math/Computer Science .0928 .2327 .7645 -
Social Sciences .0121 4.2939 .0000 -
Management/Economics .0161 4.5649 .0000 -
Humanities .0383 .0567 .0153 -
College Quality
(with respect to high selectivity)
medium selectivity .3935 -.2168 1.0792 -
low selectivity .4470 -.3838 3.5275* -0.03
Commissioning Year
(with respect to FY77)
FY78 .0969 .7545 3.5294* -
FY79 .1181 -.0385 .0145 -
FY80 .0747 -.0179 .0027 -
FY81 .1100 .3601 1.0598 -
FY82 .0858 .1940 .2999 -
FY83 .0595 .6676 1.7367 .
FY84 .1342 -.0716 .0497 -
FY85 .2735 -.2016 .4511 -
Academic Achievement
GPA (values range from to 5) 3.9122 -.0227 .0593 -
Math Proficiency (0 to 6) 4.5156 -.0161 .0271 -
Technical Proficiency (0 to 5) 3.5328 .0687 1.5132 -
Number of Observations:
Chi-Square:
991 (Y=l for 917 or 92.5 percent)
38.7 (p=0.0072)
i *** Significant at the .01 level; ** Significant at the .05 level; * Significant at the . 10 level
Marginal effects only calculated for variables that are significant to at least the .10 level, and are not
calculated for commissioning year dummies.
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Intercept 1 .3562 1.9266 -
Demographics
>2 years enlisted experience .0211 -.6136 10.0484*** -0.18
Minority .0308 -.2175 1.7368 -
Undergraduate Major
(with respect to Engineering)
Biology/Physical Sciences .1854 -.277 10.7693*** -0.07
Math/Computer Science .0947 -.1725 1.8043 -
Social Sciences .0421 -.4464 7.4275*** -0.12
Management/Economics .0393 -.5598 12.3217*** -0.15
Humanities .0146 .00644 .0005 -
Commissioning Source
interacted with College Quality
(with respect to USNA)
NROTC high selectivity .1587 .0569 .4078 -
NROTC medium selectivity .1121 .2044 3.5186* 0.05
NROTC low selectivity .1130 .1826 2.8886* 0.04
Commissioning Year
(with respect to FY77)
FY78 .1235 -.3466 5.5605** -
FY79 .1296 -.4925 11.7995*** -
FY80 .1219 -.2618 3.1365* -
FY81 .1478 -.0238 .0257 -
FY82 .1316 -.4848 11.5156*** -
FY83 .0563 .0966 .2480 -
FY84 .1053 -.2596 2.8620* -
FY85 .0911 -.6116 16.4051*** -
Academic Achievement
GPA (values range from to 5) 3.4478 .182 13.6434*** .04
Math Proficiency (0 to 6) 4.5409 .0593 1.1673 -
Technical Proficiency (0 to 5) 3.4660 .0417 1.2821 -
Number of Observations:
Chi-Square:
2470 (Y=l for 2064 or 83.6 percent)
139.3 (p=0.0001)
1 *** Significant at the .01 level; ** Significant at the .05 level; * Significant at the .10 level
2
Marginal effects only calculated for variables that are significant to at least the .10 level, and are not
calculated for commissioning year dummies. The marginal effect of GPA represents a change from Cat3
(2.6-3.2) to Cat4 (3.2-3.6) which is around the mean value. Effects are presented for the range of possible
GPA values in Chapter IV.
86






Intercept 1 -.6999 12.0798 -
Demographics
>2 years enlisted experience .0947 .3122 6.0841** 0.12
Minority .0258 -.0908 .3041 -
Undergraduate Major
(with respect to Engineering)
Biology/Physical Sciences .2012 -.0687 .9686 -
Math/Computer Science .0939 -.2451 5.4274** -0.10
Social Sciences .0292 .0951 .2969 -
Management/Economics .0300 -.1305 .6018 -
Humanities .0227 -.081 .1573 -
Commissioning Source
interacted with College Quality
(with respect to USNA)
NROTC high selectivity .1023 -.1462 2.5736* -0.06
NROTC medium selectivity .0785 -.0145 .0204 -
NROTC low selectivity .0750 -.254 6.0699** -0.10
OCS high selectivity .0473 -.33 6.5051** -0.01
OCS medium selectivity .1104 -.2587 7.8536*** -0.10
OCS low selectivity .1293 -.4314 22.9353*** -0.17
NESEP .0308 -.0409 .0424 -
Commissioning Year
(with respect to FY77)
FY78 .0981 .0406 .1053 -
FY79 .1197 .2167 3.2582 -
FY80 .1066 .3901 10.3526* -
FY81 .1435 .5094 19.4865*** -
FY82 .1154 .8042 43.8583*** -
FY83 .0723 1.6139 111.2801*** -
FY84 .1177 1.1071 78.3045*** -
FY85 .1508 1.0530 75.5787*** -
Academic Achievement
GPA (values range from to 5) 3.6068 .1558 16.9500*** .06
Math Proficiency (0 to 6) 4.5375 -.0248 .3668 -
Technical Proficiency (0 to 5) 3.5156 -.0162 .3423 -
Number of Observations:
Chi-Square:
2599 (Y=l for 1466 or 56.4 percent)
378.5 (p=0.0001)
1 *** Significant at the .01 level; ** Significant at the .05 level; * Significant at the .10 level
2
Marginal effects only calculated for variables that are significant to at least the . 10 level, and are not
calculated for commissioning year dummies. The marginal effect of GPA represents a change from Cat3
(2.6-3.2) to Cat4 (3.2-3.6) which is around the mean value. Effects are presented for the range of possible
GPA values in Chapter IV.
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Intercept 1 -.6889 2.1303 -
Demographics















































































GPA (values range from to 5)
Math Proficiency (0 to 6)













746 (Y=l for 420 or 56.3 percent)
163.0 (p=0.0001)
1 *** Significant at the .01 level; ** Significant at the .05 level; * Significant at the .10 level
2
Marginal effects only calculated for variables that are significant to at least the .10 level, and are not
calculated for commissioning year dummies.
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Intercept 1 -1.1401 19.1906 -
Demographics
>2 years enlisted experience .0186 -.1514 .3970 -
Minority .0282 .1955 1.0304 -
Undergraduate Major
(with respect to Engineering)
Biology/Physical Sciences .1777 -.1358 2.4174 -
Math/Computer Science .0942 -.1935 2.1408 -
Social Sciences .0367 .1839 .9075 -
Management/Economics .0333 -.1205 .3967 -
Humanities .0141 -.2392 .7239 -
Commissioning Source
interacted with College Quality
(with respect to USNA)
NROTC high selectivity .1500 -.1292 1.9785 -
NROTC medium selectivity .1151 .0117 .0129 -
NROTC low selectivity .1100 -.2249 4.7062** -0.09
Commissioning Year
(with respect to FY77)
FY78 .1083 .0850 .3603 -
FY79 .1168 .2811 4.0822** -
FY80 .1201 .3934 8.2645*** -
FY81 .1574 .5235 16.0805*** -
FY82 .1303 .7571 30.9149*** -
FY83 .0711 1.7038 84.4768*** -
FY84 .1128 1.0375 51.8941*** -
FY85 .0953 1.2168 63.4896*** -
Academic Achievement
GPA (values range from to 5) 3.4907 .1515 9.6672*** .06
Math Proficiency (0 to 6) 4.5764 .0424 .5396 -
Technical Proficiency (0 to 5) 3.5217 .0192 .2771 -
Number of Observations:
Chi-Square:
1773 (Y=l for 1000 or 56.4 percent)
247.8 (p=0.0001)
1 *** Significant at the .01 level; ** Significant at the .05 level; * Significant at the .10 level
2 Marginal effects only calculated for variables that are significant to at least the . 10 level, and are not
calculated for commissioning year dummies. The marginal effect of GPA represents a change from Cat3
(2.6-3.2) to Cat4 (3.2-3.6) which is around the mean value. Effects are presented for the range of possible
GPA values in Chapter IV.
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Intercept 1 .1351 .5591 -
Demographics
>2 years enlisted experience .0901 .2818 6.0828** 0.11
Minority .0257 -.2146 1.9023 -
Undergraduate Major
(with respect to Engineering)
Biology/Physical Sciences .2094 .0123 .0371 -
Math/Computer Science .0940 -.1944 3.9412** -0.07
Social Sciences .0283 -.1581 1.0145 -
Management/Economics .0276 -.3526 4.7072** -0.13
Humanities .0218 -.0708 .1451 -
Commissioning Source
interacted with College Quality
(with respect to USNA)
NROTC high selectivity .1070 -.2515 9.2128*** -0.10
NROTC medium selectivity .0787 -.1297 1.9807 -
NROTC low selectivity .0790 -.2481 7.0953*** -0.10
OCS high selectivity .0491 -.5676 21.2596*** -0.21
OCS medium selectivity .1180 -.5722 44.7260*** -0.21
OCS low selectivity .1310 -.3429 17.3198*** -0.13
NESEP .0309 .3851 4.2933** 0.15
Commissioning Year
(with respect to FY77)
FY78 .1190 -.0838 .6618 -
FY79 .1219 .0203 .0391 -
FY80 .1099 -.2725 6.6884*** -
FY81 .1421 -.2841 8.0384*** -
FY82 .1102 -.2556 5.8132** -
FY83 .0611 1.5689 97.0502*** -
FY84 .1112 -.2997 7.8070*** -
FY85 .1349 -.5060 22.1326*** -
Academic Achievement
GPA (values range from to 5) 3.6086 .1250 12.6719*** .05
Math Proficiency (0 to 6) 4.5462 -.0771 4.1200** -.03
Technical Proficiency (0 to 5) 3.5351 -.0418 2.6605 -
Number of Observations:
Chi-Square:
3076 (Y=l for 1258 or 40.9 percent)
414.9 (p=0.0001)
1 *** Significant at the .01 level; ** Significant at the .05 level; * Significant at the .10 level
2
Marginal effects only calculated for variables that are significant to at least the .10 level, and are not calculated for
commissioning year dummies. The marginal effect of GPA represents a change from Cat3 (2.6-3.2) to Cat4 (3.2-3.6)
which is around the mean value. For Math Proficiency, the effect is calculated for a change from Cat4 to Cat5, again
around the mean. Effects are presented for the range of possible GPA values in Chapter fV.
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Intercept 1 -.8565 4.7749 -
Demographics
















































































GPA (values range from to 5)
Math Proficiency (0 to 6)














917 (Y=l for 292 or 31.8 percent)
178.7 (p=0.0001)
1 *** Significant at the .01 level; ** Significant at the .05 level; * Significant at the .10 level
2
Marginal effects only calculated for variables that are significant to at least the .10 level, and are not
calculated for commissioning year dummies. The marginal effect of GPA represents a change from Cat3
(2.6-3.2) to Cat4 (3.2-3.6) which is around the mean value. For Math Proficiency, the effect is calculated
for a change from Cat4 to Cat5, again around the mean. Effects are presented for the range of possible
GPA values in Chapter IV.
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Intercept 1 -.1977 .7089 -
Demographics
>2 years enlisted experience .0165 .2438 1.0728 -
Minority .0276 -.1145 .4118 -
Undergraduate Major
(with respect to Engineering)
Biology/Physical Sciences .1788 -.0546 .4673 -
Math/Computer Science .0945 -.3028 6.2654** -0.12
Social Sciences .0359 -.2807 2.5744* -0.11
Management/Economics .0315 -.6293 10.8267*** -0.23
Humanities .0150 -.5605 4.7453** -0.21
Commissioning Source
interacted with College Quality
(with respect to USNA)
NROTC high selectivity .1594 -.2375 8.1367*** -0.09
NROTC medium selectivity .1172 -.1246 1.7999 -
NROTC low selectivity .1177 -.2308 6.1074** -0.09
Commissioning Year
(with respect to FY77)
FY78 .1231 -.0419 .1221 -
FY79 .1226 -.1484 1.5139 -
FY80 .1226 -.3047 6.3729** -
FY81 .1579 -.3535 9.4947*** -
FY82 .1250 -.3812 9.9594*** -
FY83 .0610 1.4599 59.1900*** -
FY84 .1056 -.2794 4.9422** -
FY85 .0819 -.3940 8.5531*** -
Academic Achievement
GPA (values range from to 5) 3.4869 .1121 6.2759** .04
Math Proficiency (0 to 6) 4.5703 .0337 .4067 -
Technical Proficiency (0 to 5) 3.531 -.0575 2.9128* -.02
Number of Observations:
Chi-Square:
2064 (Y=l for 897 or 43.5 percent)
203.6 (p=0.0001)
*** Significant at the .01 level; ** Significant at the .05 level; * Significant at the . 10 level
2
Marginal effects only calculated for variables that are significant to at least the .10 level, and are not
calculated for commissioning year dummies. The marginal effect of GPA represents a change from Cat3
(2.6-3.2) to Cat4 (3.2-3.6) which is around the mean value. For Technical Proficiency, the effect is
calculated for a change from Cat3 to Cat4, again around the mean. Effects are presented for the range of
possible GPA values in Chapter IV.
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Intercept 1 -.0621 .0404 -
Demographics
>2 years enlisted experience .1208 -.1634 .6376 -
Minority .0231 -.2592 .9794 -
Undergraduate Major
(with respect to Engineering)
Biology/Physical Sciences .2083 -.1205 1.0857 -
Math/Computer Science .0811 .2145 1.1751 -
Social Sciences .0318 .2864 .8823 -
Management/Economics .0270 -.1003 .1252 -
Humanities .0278 .3189 .8697 -
Commissioning Source
interacted with College Quality
(with respect to USNA)
NROTC high selectivity .0962 -.0394 .0632 -
NROTC medium selectivity .0819 -.3485 4.9705** -0.09
NROTC low selectivity .0747 -.3088 3.5059* -0.08
OCS high selectivity .0358 -.3188 1.9304 -
OCS medium selectivity .0795 -.2867 2.8930* -0.07
OCS low selectivity .1169 -.4411 8.4922*** -0.12
NESEP .0548 -.3008 1.2129 -
Commissioning Year
(with respect to FY77)
FY78 .1256 -.0835 .2024 -
FY79 .1391 -.0564 .0975 -
FY80 .0978 .0504 .0649 -
FY81 .1200 -.00216 .0001 -
FY82 .0978 .1275 .3795 -
FY83 .1375 -.0738 .1592 -
FY84 .0938 -.2762 1.9551 -
FY85 .0835 -.4037 4.0612** -
Academic Achievement
GPA (values range from to 5) 3.6089 .3528 32.3838*** .09
Math Proficiency (0 to 6) 4.4952 -.00758 .0131 -
Technical Proficiency (0 to 5) 3.4738 .0149 .1085 -
Number of Observations:
Chi-Square:
1258 (Y=l for 1031 or 82.0 percent)
79.3 (p=0.0001)
*** Significant at the .01 level; ** Significant at the .05 level; * Significant at the .10 level
2
Marginal effects only calculated for variables that are significant to at least the .10 level, and are not
calculated for commissioning year dummies. The marginal effect of GPA represents a change from Cat3
(2.6-3.2) to Cat4 (3.2-3.6) which is around the mean value. Effects are presented for the range of possible
GPA values in Chapter IV.
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Intercept 1 -.9929 1.7750 -
Demographics













































































GPA (values range from to 5)
Math Proficiency (0 to 6)













292 (Y=l for 227 or 77.7 percent)
28.5 (p=0.0985)
1 *** Significant at the .01 level; ** Significant at the .05 level; * Significant at the .10 level
2 Marginal effects only calculated for variables that are significant to at least the .10 level, and are not
calculated for commissioning year dummies. The marginal effect of GPA represents a change from Cat3
(2.6-3.2) to Cat4 (3.2-3.6) which is around the mean value. Effects are presented for the range of possible
GPA values in Chapter IV.
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Intercept 1 -.3620 .7498 -
Demographics
>2 years enlisted experience .0201 -.3667 1.1663 -
Minority .0256 -.1029 .1109 -
Undergraduate Major
(with respect to Engineering)
Biology/Physical Sciences .1839 -.1615 1.2666 -
Math/Computer Science .0858 .1326 .3132 -
Social Sciences .0346 .2664 .5446 -
Management/Economics .0212 -.3447 .9594 -
Humanities .0123 .2284 .1607 -
Commissioning Source
interacted with College Quality
(with resDect to USNA)
NROTC high selectivity .1349 -.0547 .1183 -
NROTC medium selectivity .1148 -.3494 4.7866** -0.09
NROTC low selectivity .1048 -.3282 3.8806** -0.08
Commissioning Year
(with respect to FY77)
FY78 .1371 .1425 .4320 -
FY79 .1237 .1465 .4453 -
FY80 .1037 .1345 .3472 -
FY81 .1304 .0942 .1889 -
FY82 .1026 .1825 .6063 -
FY83 .1293 .1210 .3075 -
FY84 .0948 -.2080 .8574 -
FY85 .0658 -.1087 .1865 -
Academic Achievement
GPA (values range from to 5) 3.5632 .3737 19.5311*** .09
Math Proficiency (0 to 6) 4.5964 -.0001 .0000 -




897 (Y=l for 753 or 84.0 percent)
51.9 (p=0.0002)
*** Significant at the .01 level; ** Significant at the .05 level; * Significant at the .10 level
2
Marginal effects only calculated for variables that are significant to at least the .10 level, and are not calculated for
commissioning year dummies. The marginal effect ofGPA represents a change from Cat3 (2.6-3.2) to Cat4 (3.2-3.6)




Appendix B provides information on the distribution of officers in various
important explanatory variable categories. Both the actual number of officers and the
corresponding percentage are listed.
Table B.l Distribution of Officers in the Combined Population
Category Graduate Performance Retention Promotion
Total Number (N=. .
.
)
3567 2599 3076 1258
# % # % # % # %
Met criteria for Y=l 3076 86.2 1466 56.4 1258 40.9 1031 82.0
Demographics
>2 years enlisted 309 8.7 246 9.5 277 9.0 152 12.1
Minority 99 2.8 67 2.6 79 2.6 29 2.3
Undergraduate
Major
Bio/Physical Sciences 759 21.3 523 20.1 644 20.9 262 20.8
Math/Computer Sci 334 9.4 244 9.4 289 9.4 102 8.1
Engineering 2166 60.7 1619 62.3 1904 61.9 785 62.4
Social Sciences 117 3.3 76 2.9 87 2.8 40 3.2
Management 117 3.3 78 3.0 85 2.8 34 2.7
Humanities 74 2.1 59 2.3 67 2.2 35 2.8
Commissioning
Source
USNA 1522 42.7 1108 42.6 1250 40.6 579 46.0
NROTC 948 26.6 665 25.6 814 26.5 318 25.3
OCS 991 27.8 746 28.7 917 29.8 292 23.2




5: 3.60-4.00 577 16.2 452 17.4 525 17.1 236 18.8
4: 3.20-3.59 1146 32.1 839 32.3 1013 32.9 388 30.8
3:2.60-3.19 1619 45.4 1157 44.5 1364 44.3 547 43.5
2: 2.20-2.59 204 5.7 136 5.2 158 5.1 80 6.4
1: 1.90-2.19 19 0.5 15 0.6 15 0.5 7 0.6
0: 0-1.89 2 0.1 0.0 1 0.0 0.0
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Table B.2 Distribution ofOCS Graduates
Category Graduate Performance Retention Promotion
Total Number (N=. .
.
)
991 746 917 292
# % # % # % # %
Met criteria for Y=l 917 92.5 420 56.3 292 31.8 227 77.7
Demographics
>2 years enlisted 152 15.3 133 17.8 149 16.2 65 22.3
Minority 21 2.1 16 2.1 20 2.2 5 1.7
Undergraduate
Major
Bio/Physical Sciences 294 29.7 201 26.9 268 29.2 93 31.9
Math/Computer Sci 92 9.3 71 9.5 87 9.5 19 6.5
Engineering 539 54.4 415 55.6 498 54.3 137 46.9
Social Sciences 12 1.2 10 1.3 12 1.3 8 2.7
Management 16 1.6 15 2.0 16 1.7 11 3.8
Humanities 38 3.8 34 4.6 36 3.9 24 8.2
College Quality
High Selectivity 158 15.9 123 16.5 151 16.5 45 15.4
Medium Selectivity 390 39.4 287 38.5 363 39.6 100 34.3




5: 3.60-4.00 257 25.9 202 27.1 241 26.3 87 29.8
4: 3.20-3.59 431 43.5 313 42.0 390 42.5 107 36.6
3:2.60-3.19 270 27.2 203 27.2 253 27.6 79 27.1
2: 2.20-2.59 25 2.5 20 2.7 25 2.7 13 4.5
1: 1.90-2.19 8 0.8 8 1.1 8 0.9 6 2.1
0: 0-1.89 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
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Table B.3 Distribution ofUSNA and NROTC Graduates
Category Graduate Performance Retention Promotion
Total Number (N=. .
.) 2470 1773 2064 897
# % # % # % # %
Met criteria for Y=l 2064 83.6 1000 56.4 897 43.5 753 84.0
Demographics
>2 years enlisted 52 2.1 33 1.9 34 1.6 18 2.0
Minority 76 3.1 50 2.8 57 2.8 23 2.6
Undergraduate
Major
Bio/Physical Sciences 458 18.5 315 17.8 369 17.9 165 18.4
Math/Computer Sci 234 9.5 167 9.4 195 9.4 77 8.6
Engineering 1541 62.4 1142 64.4 1330 64.4 594 66.2
Social Sciences 104 4.2 65 3.7 74 3.6 31 3.5
Management 97 3.9 59 3.3 65 3.1 19 2.1
Humanities 36 1.5 25 1.4 31 1.5 11 1.2
College Quality
(for NROTC)
High Selectivity 392 41.4 266 40.0 329 40.4 121 38.1
Medium Selectivity 277 29.2 204 30.7 242 29.7 103 32.4




5: 3.60-4.00 301 12.2 237 13.4 269 13.0 138 15.4
4: 3.20-3.59 690 27.9 509 28.7 600 29.1 264 29.4
3:2.60-3.19 1305 52.8 919 51.8 1069 51.8 437 48.7
2: 2.20-2.59 164 6.6 103 5.8 120 5.8 57 6.4
1: 1.90-2.19 8 0.3 5 0.3 5 0.2 1 0.1
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